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Articles
Toward a "Due Foundation" for the Separation of
Powers: The Federalist Papers as Political
Narrative
Victoria Nourse*
If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl:
Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent
of each other. 1
During the past quarter century, lawyers have become strangely comfortable with descriptions of our government's structure that would, to an
untutored ear, spea.K contradiction. We are quite satisfied to say that
governmental powers are separate and shared, departments distinct and
overlapping, functions autonomous and interdependent.2 We have settled

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin School of Law. B.A. 1980, Stanford
University; J.D. 1984, University of California (Boalt Hall). For reading and commenting on this
work, I owe thanks to many, including Ann Althouse, Gordon Baldwin, Rick Cudahy, Neil Komesar,
Lany Kramer, H. I efferson Powell, Jane Schacter, and Allan Stein. Special thanks go to Philip Bobbitt
for his encouragement. This article would never have been completed without the dedicated efforts of
the editors of the Teras Law Review and the excellent research assistance of Michelle Bellia, David Lu,
and Tamara Packard. In the end, of course, all errors are my own.
1. 2 THE REcoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION] (statement ofJames Madison of Virginia, July 17, 1787).
2. The most famous formulation of this kind appears in Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sa~er:
The Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). It is oft-repeated. See, e.g., Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (both
quoting Justice Jackson's statement in Youngstown).
447
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into these contradictions as we would a roomy chair: talking this way is no
longer controversial but taken for granted, uttered with a knowing wink,
perceived as the starting point of sophisticated analysis. A not "entirely
separate, " 3 but "entirely free, " 4 set of departments is the only way we can
think about the separation of powers anymore. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has even managed to convince itself that these "cancelling quotations"5
best describe historical understandings. 6
Exhausted by this discourse of cancellation, we cling to reminders of
the importance of the separation of power. On a regular basis, we invoke
Madison's words from The Federalist that "[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, ... may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny. " 7 Repeated so often, however, the words have almost lost
their meaning. 8 If we step back and repeat them, we find Madison's
statement oddly exaggerated. We live in a world in which the very
"tyranny" Madison decries has become banal: daily, the departments each
perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions without inspiring the
slightest public outcry against "tyranny. " 9
This Article argues that these fragmentary and contradictory understandings depend upon a partial, but serious, misunderstanding of the very
idea of separated powers. Every time we use the term "separation of
powers," we invoke a common, yet tacit, narrative of power-a narrative
constructed upon the idea of legal authority: we imagine the executive,

3. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380 (citing Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,443
(1977)).
4. Id. (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. United Ststes, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
5. This reference is to Justice Jackson's ststement in Youngstown that "[a] century and a half of
partisan debate and scholarly speculation" about the separation of powers has yielded no net result other
than "apt quotstions" that "largely cancel each other." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J .,
concurring).
6. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380 (attributing to the Framers and specifically to James Madison the
idea that each of the three branches need not be "entirely separate and distinct" but must remain
"entirely free from the control or coercive influence" of the others (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S.
at 629)).
7. THE FEDERAUST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added). Unless otherwise noted, all references to 7he Federalist are to the essays written by James
Madison as they appear in the Rossiter edition.
8. As Rebecca Brown has put it, "The brief bow to Madison so often performed ••• is more a
ritualistic gesture than an effort to supply a meaningful framework for the inquiry at hand. The quoted
passage rarely, if ever, appears to influence the writer's analysis in any substsntive way." Rebecca L.
Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1515 (1991).
9. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 492 (1987) ("[O]ur formal, threebranch theory of government-at least as traditionally expressed-cannot describe the government we
long have had •••• "). Indeed, we have known this for sometime. See Myers v. United Ststes, 272
U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (ststing that the Constitution "left to each [branch]
power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial").
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judicial, and legislative powers divided and neatly arranged among the
departments. In this Article, I explore the implications of a different
narrative of power, one based on the idea that power is as much constituted
by the political relationships the Constitution creates as by the legal
authority it bestows. I argue that the separation of political power is as,
if not more, vital to the continued separation of our governmental institutions as the separation of any particular function or the allocation of any
particular legal authority. 10
I arrive at this rather untraditional position by revisiting a very
traditional text, a text that has often seemed the source of all our cancelling
quotations: Madison's Federalist essays Nos. 47 through 51. Whether we
are originalists or not,11 the stories we tell of the separation of powers
today are stories we associate with The Federalist. In the past decade, no
major Supreme Court opini01r2 or law review article13 on the separation
10. The term "political power," in the sense I use it here, assumes power grounded upon human
relationships rather than legal commands. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 44 (1970) ("When
we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number
of people to act in their name.").
11. To engage with the Founders is not to make the normative claim ofanoriginalist. See, e.g.,
H. 1efferson Powell, 7he Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 885 (1985)
(arguing that the Framers did not expect courts to rely only on "intentionalism" as an interpretative
strategy); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constilution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1127
(1987) (suggesting that the Founders "intended something independent of their own intent to serve as
a source of constitutional law"). It does, however, take the Founders "seriously at the level of thought
and aspiration that they understood themselves." DAVID A.1. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM, at ix (1989). Taking this thought seriously does not bind one by historical
practice. As Professor Michelman has argued, to take the fuunding ideals of republicanism seriously
may involve "recognition[s]" that help counter received wisdom, political and otherwise. Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.1. 1493, 1495 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1454 (1995); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380, 381, 382, 394, 409, 426 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99,
704-05, 726 (1988) (Scalia, 1., dissenting); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1986);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860 (1986) (Brennan, 1., dissenting)
(all citing Madison or Madison's Federalist Papers essays to support separation of powers arguments).
13. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, On the Constilutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36
AM. U. L. REv. 491, 493 (1987); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constilution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HAR.v. L. REv. 1153, 1155-56, 1215, 1216
(1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the lAws, 104
YALE LJ. 541, 608 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, Constitutionallmproprieties: Reflections on Mistretta,
Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 357, 365, 372 & n.48 (1990)
[hereinafter Carter, Improprieties]; StephenL. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and
SubsequentDe-Evolution ofthe SeparationofPowers, 1987B.Y.U. L. REv. 719,740,773-74,776-78
[hereinafter Carter, Separation of Powers]; E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers
Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506,517-18 (1989); AbnerS. Greene, Checks
and Balances in an Era of Presidential lAwmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 123 (1994); Harold1.
Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation ofPowers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253, 1259-66,
1308 (1988); Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the •Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85
MICH. L. REv. 592, 593, 597-98, 600 (1986); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 105 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional
Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 225, 229, 258-59; Martin H. Redish &
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of powers has failed to enlist Madison or Madison's Federalist in the
contemporary battle for the separation of powers. Scholars and judges with
widely varying, indeed contradictory, views on the separation of powers
have claimed Madison's Federalist as their own, each finding an essential,
yet different, separation of powers. 14
Most understandings of Madison's work have been premised on the
idea that Madison shares our modem narrative of power-that he, too,
sought to divide the governmental universe into three separate functions or
descriptions of legal authority. My analysis suggests that this assumption
deserves serious reconsideration. Politics, rather than law, inspired
Madison's embrace of the separation ideal; 15 in the end, political restraints, rather than legal definitions, maintain the separation of powers. 16
To understand this, however, one must first understand that Madison's
vision of the separation of powers differs radically from modem lawyers'
vision. For us, the separation of powers raises questions about how to
define and arrange legal authority; for Madison, the question was how to
prevent the political collapse of a fledgling government.
Today, it seems odd that Madison's essays spend so little time
discussing items that seem so important-the definition of functions or
checks, the vesting clauses, or the terms "executive," "legislative," or
"judicial." What I propose to do in this Article is to make sense of
Madison's essays without recourse to the conventional terms-to move
beyond the cancelling rhetoric of separated and shared powers, of checks
and functional descriptions. To do that, I must recount a political history

Elizabeth J. Cisar, "'f.Angels Were to Govern •: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of
Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 449 (1991); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate
.About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 430, 435-37, 450, 452-53,
494 (1987); Strauss, supra note 9, at 494; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism .After the New Deal, 101
IIAR.V. L. REv. 421,430-35,436,450,504,505 (1987); MarkTushnet, The Sentencing Commission
and Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.
581, 598 (1992); Paul R. Verkuil, .A Proposal to Resolve InterbranchDisputes on the Practice Field,
40 CATH. U. L. REv. 839, 841 (1991) [hereinafter Verkuil, Practice Field]; Paul R. Verkuil,
Separation ofPowers, The Rule ofLaw and the Idea ofIndependence, 30 WM. &MARY L. REv. 301,
301, 303 (1989) [hereinafter Verkuil, Rule ofLaw] (all citing Madison or Madison's Federalist Papers
essays in discussion of separation of powers theory).
14. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 13, at 516-18 & n.33 (contending that Madison's view of the
separation of powers principle is consistent with pragmatic functionalism and shared powers); Merrill,
supra note 13, at 258-59 (arguing that Madison's Federalist essays are consistent with a minimalist
separation of powers theory); Redish & Cisar, supra note 13, at 462-65 (drawing on Madison's
Federalist essays in support of a formalist approach to separation of powers theory).
15. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The MadisonianMoment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 473, 480, 490-92
(1988) (positing that Madison's view of the separation of powers was based on his understanding, and
distrust, of state politics).
16. By this, I do not mean to suggest that the courts should play no role in policing structural
disputes. AB I argue in subpart V(C), the Supreme Court's role should be to ensure that no department
is permitted to corrupt the "rules of the political game."
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we have forgotten, a political history that uses different concepts and
terms-of "dependence," and "interest," and "political connection." In
that world, the greatest danger to the separation of powers was not, as we
assume today, the misallocation of legal authority; the greatest danger was
that one department might corrupt the members of a rival department.
This was not a theoretical danger; it had happened in Britain and it had
happened in America, too. By the time of the Constitutional Convention,
Madison and others had long known that maintaining separate powers was
a matter of protecting persons and incentives as well as powers and
authority. 17
Once we remember this history, we can begin to understand what we
have long skipped over as we plodded through The Federalist. We can
understand-! believe for the first time-the importance of a set of passages
in Federalist Nos. 47, 48, and 51 that have gone largely unnoticed. These
passages comprise what Madison terms the "due foundation" for the separation of powers. Without these passages, Madison's ultimate solutionhis "practical security" for the separation of powers-makes little sense,
and reduces us to trading "cancelling" adjectives about sharing and
separating, about checking and balancing.18 With these passages, we
understand that the most important requirement for a system of separated
institutions is a set of independent persons exercising incomplete power .19
17. It is easy to forget, but true, that Madison's generation was well acquainted with failed
attempts to separate power; they called it by a name we have now forgotten-they called it corruption
and dependence. The principal example of failure was, of course, the British Parliament: independent
in law, the Parliament was dependent in fact upon the King, who bought and paid for members' support
with places in his government. America fought a war inspired, at least in part, by this corruption,
only to reinvent a new kind of legislative "despotism." THOMAS ]EFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE
OF VIRGINIA 120 (William Peden ed., 1954) (1787). State constitutionmakers expressly enjoined
separate powers but these parchment barriers did nothing to prevent legislatures from forcing their
political will on other departments-by the very same means that the King had used to control
Parliament-by controlling the salary, appointment, and tenure of their institutional rivals. For this
history, see infra text accompanying notes 42-80.
18. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 493-97 (1989) (emphasizing shared powers); Greene,
supra note 13, at 124-25, 130-31, 148-53 (emphasizing checks and balances); Redish & Cisar, supra
note 13, at 474-87 (emphasizing separate functionally defined departments). My reading also diverges
significantly from major extended analyses of the Federalist Papers, none of which focus on the idea
of dependence or the importance of separating institutional allegiances. See, e.g., GEORGE W. CAREY,
THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBUC 50-95 (1989) (reeognizing the role of
personal motive without reference to the political context that makes this view intelligible); DAVlD F.
EPSTEIN, THE POUT!CAL THEORY OF niE FEDERALisr 136-41 (1984) (arguing that Madison's essays
separate power defined as "ambition"); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: niE FEDERALJsr 123,
122-25 (1981) (emphasizing Madison's reliance on bicameralism to check encroachment by the
legislature).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23. AJ; I describe later, the "independence" of persons is
not synonymous with the "separation" of persons. See infra text accompanying notes 146-49, 158-62.
The Constitution does not demand, nor did Madison advocate, a complete separation of personnel. Cf.
Steven G. Calabresi & 1oan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation
HeinOnline -- 74 Tex. L. Rev. 451 1995-1996
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With these passages, we understand that, to maintain separation, the most
important structural provisions in the Constitution are not the vesting
clauses or the terms "executive," "legislative," or "judicial," but the
seemingly pedestrian terms that govern office. 20 With these passages, we
understand that Madison's separation of powers was far less a separation
of functions or checks or constitutional authority, but, something far more
important, a separation of political power.
In Part I of this Article, I lay the historical groundwork for my
reading of The Federalist in Part IT. Part IT argues that conventional
understandings of the separation of powers have forced us into misreadings
of The Federalist and have hidden what Madison describes as the "due
foundation" for the separation of powers, a foundation built upon the
independence of persons. Part Ill returns to the conventional understandings of Madison's essays-checks, shared powers, and functional
description-and argues that none of these understandings can fully explain
Madison's theory of separate political power, since none comprehends
Madison's emphasis on political incentive and institutional design. Part
IV moves beyond the history toward theory, arguing that our conventional
understandings have misled us because they all-checks, shared powers,
and functional description-depend upon a particular, and impoverished,
idea of power as formal legal authority. In this Part, I suggest that this
assumption is what has led us, ultimately, to miss Madison's point and
elide portions of the essays that depend upon a different idea of political
power, one built upon human relationship and connection. Finally, in Part
V, I consider the implications of this rereading for modem separation of
powers theory; in particular, for functionalism, formalism, and originalism.
I also consider here how this theory helps us move beyond the current
impasse among commentators and in the Supreme Court about removal
cases such as Morrison v. Olson. 21

ofPersonnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1050-52 (1994) (highlighting the Constitution's failure to
bar all dual departmental service, but arguing that a "separation of personnel" is vital to maintain the
separation of powers (emphasis omitted)).
20. A variety of important structural provisions ensure the independence of those who hold
government power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (mandating the election of the House of Representatives "by the People"); art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (declaring election of senators by the "State legislatures"),
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. xvn, § 1 (providing that election of senators shall be "by the people
[of the State] thereof"); art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (ensuring that removal of members of Congress is determined
by Congress itself); art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (providing that congressional salaries are to be determined by
Congress "by law"); art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (separating members of the executive and legislative departments
by declaring that no member of Congress shall be an executive officer and no executive officer shall
be a member of Congress); art. ll, § 1, cis. 2-3 (commanding that the president be elected by a system
of "electors"); art. ll, § 1, cl. 6 (prohibiting Congress from reducing or increasing the president's
salary during his term of office); art. ll, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing the president to appoint his own
executive officers); art. ill, § 1 (providing life tenure and salary protections for judges).
21. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978).
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Prologue: Politics and The Federalist

A painter may defend his work as pleasing or challenging; a novelist,
as gripping or thought provoking; a social scientist, as carefully crafted or
statistically significant. A politician, however, must defend his work as
legitimate and secure. When the idea to be defended is a government, it
must not only be right; it must also work. It is in this sense that The
Federalism must be read: as a political document, crafted in the context
of political argument and intended to persuade a skeptical public audience
that the proposed scheme would succeed in practice. 23
To read The Federalist as a political document is not to ignore its
various intellectual infiuences. 14 We venture into The Federalist at our
peril if we fail to understand the philosophical "climate of opinion7125 in
which it was forged. But, too often, intellectual histories of The Federalist
have disappointed lawyers and legal scholars. We discover that what we
propose to investigate is not the unified concept we thought.26 Or, we

22. The 85 Federalist essays were written during the fall of 1787 and the spring of 1788 by
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, andJohnJay, writing under the pseudonym "Publius." Madison
wrote the five essays specifically devoted to the separation of powers. Douglass Adair, The Authorship
of the Disputed Federalist Papers (1944), reprinted in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 27, 28-29,
63-71 (Trevor Calboum ed., 1974) (arguing that Madison, not Hamilton, wrote the five essays on the
separation of powers). These essays were then, and still are today, considered a seminal work on the
nature of the Constitution and its structure. See Thomas Jefferson, Report to the President and
Directors of the Literary Fund (from the minutes of the Board of Visitors, University of Virginia)
(Mar. 4, 1825), reprinted in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 479 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)
(asserting that The Federalist is "an authority to which appeal is habitually made·by all, and rarely
declined or denied by any as evidence of the general opinion of those who framed, and of those who
accepted the Constitution ••• on questions as to its genuine meaning"). See generally James W.
Ducayet, Publius and Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The Federalist in Constitutional
Interpretation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 821 (1993).
23. The Federalist's influence during the ratification debates was substantial. See Akhil R. Amar,
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1498 n.285 (1987) ("[T]he Papers were consciously quoted and used more than any other source during the ratification period."). On the debate
between the antifederalists and the supporters of the Constitution, see generally FEDERALISTS AND
ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (John P. Kaminski
eta!. eds., 1989) [hereinafter FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS].
24. For discussions of the various intellectual influences on the Founding Generation, see
BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POUTICS (1968); FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORUM: THE lNTELLECI'UAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); J.G.A. PococK, THE
MACHIAVElliAN MOMENT: FLoRENTINE POUTICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBUCAN
TRADmoN (1975); WillS, supra note 18; and GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THB AMERICAN
REPUBUC 1776-1787 (1969).
25. CARLL. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE ElGHTEENTH-CENTURYPHILOSOPHBRS 5
(1932) ("Whether arguments command assent or not depends less upon the logic that conveys them than
upon the climate of opinion in which they were sustained.").
26. See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS37-65 (1965) (detailing various strains in the "meaning" of the separation of powers in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
political thought); Wliliam B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation ofPowers in the Age of the
Framers, 30 WM. &MARY L. REv. 263,263-64 (1989) (arguing that a variety of institutional arrangements were extolled as consistent with the "separation of powers" in eighteenth-century America).
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find that the founding moment actually changed the very idea we are
studying. 27 In the end, while we must understand the intellectual currents
flowing through The Federalist, we must judge The Federalist's arguments
within the political context in which they were forged-a context in which
failures of intellectual coherence may have been quite necessary to the
political project at hand. 28
Madison was no stranger to the task of political persuasion. He
understood, like most successful politicians, a fundamental and timeless
truth about politics: "In their obsession with the state, men are of course
obsessed with themselves. " 29 In reconstituting the nation, Madison and
his colleagues were reconstituting their generation as much as their
government. If, then, we are to understand Madison, we must try to reimagine the political context in which he acted. And, to do that, we must
first reinvent the immediacy and the danger of the project, the fears and the
hopes of Madison's audience, and the symbolic power of events that shaped
his generation's understanding of the meaning of the separation of
powers. 30

A.

Insecurity and Structure

It is widely accepted today that we have lost a coherent theoretical
vision of the separation of powers and that in the distance between
Madison's time and our own, any real understanding of the need or importance of this doctrine has been squandered. 31 Madison's essays may be

27. See J.G.A. Pocock, States, Republics, and Empires: The AmericanFoanding in Early Modem
Perspective, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THB CONSTITUTION 55, 55-70 (Terence Ball & J.G.A.
Pocock eds., 1988) [hereinafter CONCEPTUAL CHANGE] (discussing the Framers' transformative use
of the concept of separation of powers imported from England); accord Kurland, supra note 13, at 594
(remarking that the "separation of powers as adopted by the American Constitution had no true precedents either in fact or in thcozy").
28. Later, Madison was to acknowledge: "It cannot be denied without forgetting what belongs to
human nature, that in consulting the cotemporazy [sic] writings, which vindicated and recommended
the Constitution, it is fair to keep in mind that the authors might be sometimes influenced by the zeal
of advocates •••• " Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (Apr. 17, 1824), in 3 FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 463.
29. MURRAY EDELMAN, THB SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 2 (1964). Professor Edelman's
statement is a modem version of an insight well known to the Founding Generation. As Madison
himself said: "But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" THB
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322.
30. On the importance of political psychology to the understanding of The Federalist, see Paul
W. Kahn, Reason and Wzll in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE LJ. 449, 460
(1989).
31. See YoungstownSheet&Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634,634-35 (1952)(Jackson,
J., concurring) ("Just what our forefathers did envision, or would bave envisioned had they foreseen
modem conditions must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called
upon to interpret for Pharaoh."); Kurland, supra note 13, at 607, 611-12 (complaining that the
Framers' separation of powers survives in modem government "largely in name, if at all").
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almost universally cited,32 but the conventional readings, littered with the
modem spirit of cancellation, offer more solace than solution.S3 History
presents fragments of several conflicting theories that support the
and
doctrine-theories of mixed govemment,34 Whig opposition,35
36
Leveller influence. Treatises and law review articles list policy concerns
animating the separation of powers, such as the rule of law, integrity, and
individual liberty. 37 Neither the intellectual histories nor the modem
policies, however, have led to a coherent vision of the separation ideal or
its implications in the modem world. Certainly, none explains what moved
the eighteenth-century mind to embrace the "separation of powers" with
such emotion38 as a "sacred" bulwark against tyranny. 39

32. See supra note 13.
33. On the dangers of reading historical language in light of modem ideas, see Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 13, at 12-13.
34. Mixed-government theory rested upon the idea that the greatest stability in a governmental
regime is achieved by mixing the three classically elemental "forms" of government: "monarchy, the
rule of one; aristocracy, the rule of a few; and democracy, the rule of many or of all." BAILYN, supra
note 24, at 20, 20-22. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain, this took the form of
"maintaining the balance in government of the basic socio-constitutional elements of society: king,
lords, and commons." Id. at 21; see 1 WIU.IAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON nm LAws OF
ENGLAND *153-60; DAVID HUME, Ofthe Independency ofParliament, in EssAYs: MORAL, POUTICAL,
AND LITERARY 42, 43-46 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985) (both arguing that the British experience
established that a workable system of mixed government could be created and maintained).
35. For a description of eighteenth-century Whig opposition, see BAILYN, supra note 24, at 45-46.
Opposition to official corruption was one of its prominent calls-to-arms. See generally id. at 31-58;
POCOCK, supra note 24, at 506-52.
36. See GWYN, supra note 26, at 41 ("For Lilbume and the Levellers, the doctrine of the
separation of powers became one of their most powerful ideological weapons for attacking what they
considered to be parliamentary tyranny."). The Levellers, most often associated with their leader, John
Lilbume, attacked Parliament's abuse of power during the mid-seventeenth century and disputed
Parliament's right to sit as both judge and legislator, which "rob'd [the people] of their intended and
extraordinary benefit of appeales." ld. at 42 (quoting JOHN LILBURNE, THE PICTURE OF THE COUNCEL
OF STATE (1649), reprinted in THE LEVELLER TRAcrs: 1647-1653 (W. Haller & G. Davies eds.,
1944)). The Levellers also decried members of Parliament who profited from their office by holding
"places" in government, arguing that this destroyed Parliament's ability to rule in the common interest.
GWYN, supra note 26, at 39.
37. Cass Sunstein's Constitutionalism After the New Deal best details these policies. See Sunstein,
supra note 13, at 434-36; see also GEOFFREYR. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 362-65 (2d
ed. 1991) (both noting that the purposes of separation of powers include sustaining the rule of law,
fragmenting power, limiting government, and suppressing factions).
38. "The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind, arising from the opinion each
person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite that the government be so
constituted as one man need not be afraid of another." MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws, Book
XI, ch. 6[3]-[4], at 202 (David W. Carrithers ed., 1977) (Thomas Nugent trans., London, Nourse
1750) (1748) (emphasis added); see also id. at Book XII, ch. 2[1], at 217 ("Political liberty consists
in security, or at least in the opinion we have of security." (emphasis in original)).
39. See THE FEDERAIJST No. 47, at 308 (referring to the separation of power as a "sacred maxim
of free government"); see also Verkuil, Rule of Law, supra note 13, at 301-02 (arguing that the
abstractness of contemporary discussions about the separation of powers frustrates analysis).
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Today, few venture to hope that the separation of powers will rid our
government of corruption, arbitrariness, or inefficiency. Indeed, we no
longer embrace the separation of powers as a bulwark against the most
obvious danger to which it was interposed-autocracy.40 With so little
sense of the efficacy or modem importance of this principle, it is no
wonder that the emotional rhetoric of the eighteenth century is so attractive
and yet so strange to modem readers.
Imagine, however, that rather than a coherent intellectual history, we
found a political practice that illuminated the meaning of the separation of
powers. Imagine further that fears of this political practice were repeatedly
voiced in various intellectual and political tracts, in England and in the
colonies, in the records of the Constitutional Convention and in the
ratification debates. 41 Would not this political fear give us a very strong
clue about the emotion once associated with "the separation of powers"?
Would not this fear help us reclaim at least part of the tradition that we
have lost? This is the story I hope to tell in what follows, a story I believe
that legal scholars have largely ignored.
B.

Politics and Corruption

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many political
theorists, from Montesquieu to Blackstone to Hume, defenders and antagonists of the monarchy both, embraced principles we now associate with
the separation of powers. 42 As an actual description of the 13ritish
government, however, the rhetoric of the separation of powers was "not
merely inaccurate but profoundly misleading. " 43 Although the House of
Commons was in theory independent of the monarchy, in practice it was
far from a separate sphere of political power. The monarchy amassed its

40. Political scientists such as Robert Dahl have questioned the importance of the separation of
powers in preventing tyranny. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEoRY 21, 20-22
(1956) ("[W]hether or not powerful minorities or mass-based dictatorial leaders have refrained from
establishing tyranny is clearly not related to the presence or absence of constitutional separation of
powers.").
41. See infra note 155 (listing the many references made during the Constitutional Convention to
the corruption of the British "placemen").
42. See, e.g., MONTESQUJEU, supra note 38, at Book XI, ch. 6, at 201; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 34, at *153-60; HUMB, supra note 34, at 42-46. Both Montesquieu and Blackstone claimed that
the British monarchy had attained the ideal of separated powers. See MONTESQUJEU, supra note 38,
at Book XI, ch. 6, at 213; THE FEDERAI.JST No. 47, at 301-02; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at
*154-55.
43. BAILYN, supra note 24, at 23; see Pocock, supra note 27, at 64 ("[R]hetoric of the 'separation
of powers' ••• was held in check by the evident fact that the legislative power resided, not in either
house of Parliament, but in the Crown, which was united with both."); see also 4 MARK A. THOMSON,
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 355, 354-55 (1938) (noting that Blackstone's vision of the
British government as consisting of parta that served as checks upon eaclt other "never was ••• carried
out in practice for any length of time").
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power not by law or prerogative, but by patronage: the King "directed
affairs in Parliament by bribing members or their followers with
appointments to positions of preferment and profit. "44 These so-called
placemen sat in all three "estates"-Crown, Lords, and Commons--binding
their interests into a common whole.45 Failure to vote in favor of the
King's program often spelled the revocation of a post or pension.46 Not
surprisingly, many members of the House of Commons had a strong personal incentive to support the King's political initiatives. In a world in
which patronage cemented the interest of King and Commons, separate
institutions did not mean separate powers.
To the British Whig opposition, the offering of places was the "most
insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth-century despotism. "47
Crities flooded the opposition press with diatribes against the placemen.48
Patronage "rendered representatives of the people, who ought to be as
independent as those they represented, dependent upon the Court and the
ministers from whom they received it. " 49 As J.G.A. Pocock has explained, this "dependence" was "worse, because more lasting, than mere
venality": "[I]f it was bad that a member should receive a purse of guineas
for voting with the Court, it was ten times worse that he should receive a
pension, or hold an office, in the Court's gift, since this rendered
subservience to the Court his permanent interest. " 50
Trenchard, co-author of Cato's Letters, was typical of opposition
writers of his day: he did not object to the monarchy as such or even to the
individual corruption that pervaded British government. 51 He objected to
its structural implications-to the power the King obtained over the
Commons as an institution. An independent Commons, wrote Trenchard,
"must act for the common Interest of England. "52 But the Commons
could not act in the common interest when its vote had been purchased by
the King. A House of Commons corrupted by places, pensions, and

44. McDONALD, supra note 24, at 83.
45. Id.
46. COLIN R. LoVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HisrORY 433 (1962); cf. JOHN
TRENCHARD, SHORT HisrORIE OF STANDING ARMIEs IN ENGLAND (1698), reprinted in GwYN, supra
note 26, app. at 138, 139 ("[Parliament] knew [the King] would give them ready Mony no longer than
he had absolute Necessity for them •••• "). For example, "in the early years of George man outcry
was raised when General Conway was deprived of the command of a regiment because of a vote he
had given on the question of general warrants." THOMSON, supra note 43, at 360.
47. See WOOD, supra note24, at 143 (descnoing the similar views of American Whig opposition).
48. See BAILYN, supra note 24, at 45-49 (reviewing criticism of ministerial corruption in England
under Walpole); GwYN, supra note 26, at 84-85 (noting Trenchard's belief that it would be "fatal" to
the separation of powers "to have many placemen in Parliament").
49. PocoCK, supra note 24, at 407.

50. Id.
51. TRENCHARD, supra note 46, at 138.
52. Id.
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bribes, was a political body without a "will." "What shall be done,"
Trenchard asked, "when the Criminal becomes the Judg, and the
Malefactors are left to try themselves?" 53 How may the Commons
redress the grievances "occasion'd by the Executive Part of the
Government . . . if they should happen to be the same Persons, unless they
would be publick-spirited enough to hang or drown themselves?"54
By the 1770s, similar complaints had become a staple in the American
opposition press. Thomas Paine's Common Sense railed against a monarchy that "derives its whole consequence merely from being the giver of
places and pensions. " 55 The crown-appointed colonial "governors, in
imitation of the king in England, ... offer[ed] well paying positions in the
executive branch to key members of the legislature. "56 Colonial profitseeking was both rampant and widely criticized. Of "the governors'
shameless exploitation of the royal prerogative of conferring offices and
dignities, " 57 one pamphleteer wrote, "[It is] a secret poison [that] has
been spread thro'out all our Towns[,] and great Multitudes have been
secured for the corrupt Designs of an abandoned Administration. " 58
Indeed, the Declaration of Independence specifically identified the
dependency of judicial officers (then considered executors of the law) as
a reason for Revolution: the King had "made Judges dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices and the amount and payment of their
salaries" and thereby "obstructed the Administration of Justice. "59
By the end of the Revolution, Americans had "resolved to destroy the
capacity of their rulers ever again to put together such structures of
domination . . . . " 60 Borrowing the language of the Whig opposition,
American politicians decried "offices of profit" as "creating dependence
and servility" to the appointing authority. 61 Indeed, the Pennsylvania
Constitution went so far as to assert that such offices were the cause of
"faction, contention, corruption, and disorder among the people. " 62 Not
surprisingly, these voices helped to create state constitutions in which the

53. Id. at 140.
54. Id. at 141. Trenchard's work was well known and influential in colonial America. See
BAILYN, supra note 24, at 54-55; PocoCK, supra note 24, at 467-68 (both noting the influence of
Trenchard and Gordon on colonial political debate).
55. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS
5, 11 (Eric Foner ed., 1995).
56. DonaldS. Lutz, The United States Constitution, 1787, in ROOTS OF THEREPUBUC: AMERICAN
FOUNDING DOCUMENTS INTERPRETED 266, 271 (Stephen L. Schechter ed., 1990).
51. WOOD, supra note 24, at 146.
58. Id. (quoting an uncited colonial source).
59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10-11 (U.S. 1116).
60. WOOD, supra note 24, at 148.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting the Pennsylvania Constitution).

HeinOnline -- 74 Tex. L. Rev. 458 1995-1996

1996]

The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative

459

legislature, not the executive department, would appoint officers and in
which officers were barred from dual officeholding. 63
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the framers of these new
state constitutions made explicit the idea that governmental power should
be exercised by separate and distinct departments. 64 This idea reflected
a variety of influences and intellectual commitments-commitments to an
idea of mixed government, to the efficient exercise of power, and to the
separation of conflicting interests. 65 But the political and psychological
certainty with which the separation ideal was embraced owed at least as
much to the experience of "dependent" officers as it did to these goals and
ideas. The very idea of dependency carried with it fears of structural
collapse and perversion, transforming public into private interest. 66 What
better way to prevent corruption of officers than by declaring that the
departments be administered separately and distinctly? As J.G.A. Pocock
has put it, the colonists "found themselves committed to the model of a
republic of separated powers, in the belief that this would check the
executive's tendency to corrupt the legislature.... " 67
It only took a decade to dash the colonists' hope for a separation of
powers achieved by constitutional prohibition. The framers of the state
constitutions had placed great faith in the new constitutional provisions

63. See McDONALD, supra note 24, at 86 (noting that many state constitutions forbade or
restricted holding of multiple offices or required rotation in office). Some historians appear to assume
that dual-officeholdingprovisions in the state constitutions eradicated fears of corruption. See, e.g.,
WOOD, supra note 24, at 156 (suggesting that dual-officeholding prohibitions could prevent the
"dependencies" decried by drafters of the state constitutions). A review of Madison's notes from the
Constitutional Convention and various records of the ratification debates makes clear that fears
associated with dependency remained long after dual officeholding was barred. See infra text
accompanying notes 73-80.
64. WOOD, supra note24, at 157,449.
65. See, e.g., TRENCHARD, supra note 46, at 138. See generally Sunstein, supra note 13, at 4366
(asserting that the Founding Generation believed that separating power was necessary to avoid concentration of authority, to limit the ability of government to act, to minimize the influence of private
interest groups, and to promote stability in the political system).
66. J.G.A. POCOCK, Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American 'Ihought, in POLITICS,
LANGUAGE & TIME: EssAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 80, 92-93 (1971).
67. Pocock, supra note 27, at 65; see also Lutz, supra note 56, at 271 (stating that out of the
"colonial attempt to prevent the crown-appointed governments from buying off members of the
legislature" came widespread calls for a government of separated powers). This is not an idiosyncratic
position, although it is one largely ignored by legal scholars. Recently, Professor Steven Calabresi has
revived at lesst some of this early American history but has suggested (wrongly, I believe) that the
Founders drew no explicit connection between the independence of officers and the separation of
powers. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 19, at 1062, 1062-65 (arguing that constitutions! provisions
separating personnel-i.e., the incompatibility clauses barring dual officeholding-had the
"unanticipated consequence[]" of "reinforc[ing] ••• the separation of powers" (emphasis added)). As
notes from both the Constitutions! Convention and the ratification debates suggest, the connection
between the separation of powers and fears of "dependent" officers were far from inadvertent. See
infra text accompanying notes 73-80, 109-10, and 153-57.
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demanding separate powers. 68 But, in constructing their governments,
they had inadvertently transplanted the sins of the monarchy to the state
legislatures. Armed with the power to appoint and remove judges and
administrators, as well as the power to increase or decrease their
salaries, 69 state legislatures could, and did, manipulate the governor and
the judiciary to serve their own ends.70 Soon, writers such as Thomas
Jefferson attacked the state constitutions in almost the same terms as
patriots had decried the British colonial efforts of years earlier-as
tyrannies built upon patronage, dependency, and corruption.71 As St.
George Tucker described the political situation in Virginia, the executive
possessed "not a single feature of Independence" because "in Virginia, [it]
is chosen, paid, directed, and removed by the legislature. "n
Given this history, it is not surprising to see the language of
dependence and separation surfacing hand in hand during many of the most
important debates at the Constitutional Convention. Take, for example, the
battle over the structure of the executive department. For most of the
convention, the president was to be elected by the "national legislature"
(the House of Representatives). 73 Some delegates sought to make the

68. THE FEDERAUsr No. 48, at 312-13.
69. WOOD, supra note24, at 148, 161.
70. Thomas Jefferson wrote of Virginia,
The judiciary and executive members were left dependant on the legislative, for their
subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. • • • They have
accordingly, in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary
controversy: and the direction of the executive, during the whole time of their session,
is becoming habitual and familiar.
JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 120; see THE FEDERAUsr No. 48, at 311 (quoting this passage from
Jefferson).
71. See JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 121 (warning that the powers of the departments of
government "must be so divided and guarded as to prevent those given to one from being engrossed
by the other; and if properly separated, the persons who officiate in the several departments become
centinels in behalf of the people to guard against every possible usurpation"). The term "engrossment"
was typically used to refer to the practice of buying the influence of government officers. See, e.g.,
1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 101 (statement of George Mason of Virginia, June 4, 1787)
(complaining that "[t]he Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures till new appointments
shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed all these into his own hands, the American
Executive, like the British, will by bnoery & influence, save himself the trouble" of using the veto
(emphasis added)).
72. CHARLES S. SYDNOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE MAKING: POLITICAL PRACI'ICES
IN WASHINGTON'S VIRGINIA 87 (1965) (quoting ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES:
WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAws, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINrA app. at 119 (1803)).
73. The Virginia Plan provided "that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the
National Legislature for the term of [blank] years •••• " 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at
21 (May 29, 1787) (recording the resolutions proposed by Edmund Randolph of Virginia). This issue
remained unresolved far into the convention. See 2 id. at 401-04 (Aug. 24, 1787) (recounting the
continuing debate on how to structure the executive).
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president "absolutely dependent" on the legislature.74 Others argued that
such a dependency would breed corruption: "If the Executive be chosen by
the Natl. Legislature, he will not be independent on [sic] it; and if not
independent, usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be
the consequence. " 75 Madison insisted upon an "independent" executive,
agreeing with Elbridge Gerry that presidential appointment by the
legislature "would give birth to intrigue and corruption between the
Executive & Legislature previous to the election and to partiality in the
Executive afterwards to the friends who promoted him. " 76
Similar terms governed the debate over the selection of senators, 77
the payment of members of Congress/8 and the president's tenure in
office. 79 Madison summed up the connections between the idea of
political "independence" of officers and the separation of powers in his

74. 1 id. at 68 (statement of Roger Sherman of Connecticut, June 1, 1787).
75. 2 id. at 31 (statement of Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, July 17, 1787) (emphasis
added); see also 1 id. at 69 (statement of James Wtlson of Pennsylvania, June 1, 1787) (arguing for
"appointment by the people" because this would make the executive branch "as independent as
possible").
76. 1 id. at 175 (statement of Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, June 9, 1787). This was
Madison's preferred position. In the end, of course, he supported the "electoral college" compromise
that mediated direct election with a system of electors and allowed a role for Congress in the election
of the president in case no candidate obtained a majority of electoral votes. THE FHoERAUsr No. 39,
at 244 (describing the electoral college system as characteristic of a republican form of government).
Histocy, however, has tended to prove the validity of Madison's concerns about a congressional role
in presidential elections. The election of 1824, which was thrown into the House of Representatives,
led to charges that John Quincy Adams struck a deal for the presidency by buying "places" in his
administration for his supporters in the House. See generally Victor Williams & Alison M.
MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and its 7Welfth Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our
Nation's Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Electian Systems, 77MARQ. L. REV. 201,209-10
(1994).
77. The Virginia plan provided that "members of the second branch of the National Legislature
ought to be elected by those of the first •••• " 1 FEDERAL CoNVENTION, supra note 1, at 20 (May
27, 1787) (recording the resolutions proposed by Edmund Randolph of Virginia). To such suggestions,
it was argued that if the Senate were to be appointed by the first branch, "it would make them too
dependent, and thereby destroy the end for which the Senate ought to be appointed." 1 id. at 59
(statement of Roger Sherman of Connecticut, May 31, 1787); see also 1 id. at 52 (statement of James
Wtlson of Pennsylvania, May 31, 1787) (asserting that the Senate ought to be "independent" of the
national legislature); 1 id. at 59 (statement of George Mason of Virginia, May 31, 1787) (expressing
the opinion that it "would be highly improper to draw the Senate out of the first branch ••• [because]
it would make the Members too dependent on the first branch") (emphases added throughout).
78. 1 id. at 215-16 (statement of James Madison of Virginia, June 12, 1787) (arguing that
payment of the members of the national legislature by the states would "creste an improper
dependence"); 2 id. at 292 (statement of Daniel Carroll of Macyland, August 14, 1787) ("[Members
of Congress] ought. •• not ••• be dependent on nor be paid by the States.").
79. See 2 id. at 102 (statement of Elbridge Gerry ofMassachusetts, July 24, 1787) (arguing that
the president should serve for as many as 20 years to diminish his "dependence" on the legislature if
elected by that body); 2 id. at 102 (statement of James Wilson of Pennsylvania, July 24, 1787)
(agreeing to "almost any length of time" for presidential tenure to eliminate the "dependence" that will
result from appointment by the legislature).
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argument that the president, if chosen by the House, should not be eligible
for re-election:
If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legis!: Execut:
& Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of
the separation, that they should be independent of each other. The
Executive could not be independent of the Legislure [sic], if
dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. Why
was it determined that the Judges should not hold their places by
such a tenure? Because they might be tempted to cultivate the
Legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus render the
Legislature the virtual expositor, as well the maker of the laws. In
like manner a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would
render it the Executor as well as the maker of laws; & then
according to the observation ofMontesquieu, tyrannical laws may be
made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner. 80

We have come full circle, to "tyrannical laws" via dependence, and
now have a better idea of the concrete political images that moved a
generation to embrace the separation of powers as "sacred. " 81 Imagine
that you are faced with the prospect of a government in which the persons
who hold power on your behalf-your representatives-are "dependent" for
their livelihood upon their political rivals. The representatives no longer
represent only you in the competition for political power; they also
represent their own personal interests. Imagine further that you have no
political recourse: there is no rival center of political power to challenge
the status quo. Is not this scheme-one in which the private interest of the
governors may easily prevail over the public interest-the very definition
of tyranny? Is not this scheme-one in which political power has become
a private commodity-the antithesis of a republic? Is not this scheme a
government of men, not laws?
Focusing on these political experiences not only resurrects the fears
of a generation that embraced the separation of powers; it also helps to
explain some of the difficulties posed by the modem separation ideal. If
I am correct that the emotional power of the separation of powers doctrine
lies in the political experience of "dependent" officers but that its rhetoric
embraces far more abstract conflicts of function, it is not surprising that we
might have lost the power of the original. The intellectual move from
officials to entities, from persons to repositories of power, from will to
function, subtracts the human dimension of governance.
Rather than

80. 2 id. at 34 (statement of James Madison of Virginia, July 17, 1787) (emphasis added).
Similar terms were used during the ratification debates to couch claims that the new constitution
violated the separation of powers. See infra notes 156-57.
81. See supra note 39.
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imagining individuals who wield power corruptly, we imagine institutions
with conflicting functions. And once we focus on institutions, any
necessary connection between the idea of separate powers and personal
corruption disappears. What was once "sacred" is still embraced as
sacred, but, in the process, we have forgotten why it is more than
mundane.
I make no claim that this story fully explains the separation of
powers-a concept that embraces a set of ideas, not a single event or
theory. 82 I see the political history I have emphasized as a moment
uniting "[t]he psychological and the political" as "different perspectives on
the same problem. " 83 Long after the intellectual histories and the policy
reasons have left us wondering what 1he Federalist's fear of "tyranny" is ·
all about, we can see much in this political history that helps us to
appreciate, at least in part, the fear and the expectations of those who
embraced the separation of powers as a "sacred maxim" both intrinsically
valuable and "essential to the preservation of liberty. " 84
II.

Rereading 1he Federalist on the Separation of Powers

1he Federalist No. 51, Madison's major essay on the separation of
powers, begins with an important question: "To what expedient, then, shall
we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of
power among the several departments as laid down in the Constitution?"85
Scholars have answered this question in as many different ways as they
have described the separation of powers. 86 But, in the process, most have
missed something important in the question itself. Madison says: "To what
expedient then shall we finally resort ... ?" 87 This phrasing tells us that
the essay marks an end: No. 51 is the culmination of a series of essays in
which Madison rejects various proposals for maintaining the separation of
powers. At the same time, the quotation also tells us that we are at a
beginning: the beginning of a true search for an expedient that will
maintain "in practice the necessary partition. " 88

82. See generally GWYN, supra note 26, at 37-65 (discussing the many concerns underlying the
seventeenth-century British commitment to separation of powers); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 430-36
(discussing the policies served by the separation of powers).
83. PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HlsrORY 15 (1992).
84. THE FEDERALisr No. 47, at 301 ("No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value
•••• "); THE FEDERALisr No. 51, at 321 (arguing that the "separate and distinct exercise of the
different powers of government" is "admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of
liberty").
85. THE FEDERALisr No. 51, at 320.
86. Compare WIU.S, supra note 18, at 122 (arguing that bicameralism acts as the expedient in
Madison's separation theory) wiJh Redish & Cisar, supra note 13, at 462-65 (suggesting that the
expedient is found in the formal division of exclusive power among the branches).
87. THE FEDERALisrNo. 51, at 320.
88. Id.
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In this ending and beginning, we find a crucial distinction. In No. 51,
we are told that Madison is looking for something that will "maintain[] in
practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments as
laid down in the Constitution. "89 We find in this single question two very
important, but little understood, points about 11ze Federalist's view of the
separation of powers. First, Madison assumes, rather than articulates, a
division of power; second, he assumes that the division is not itself
sufficient to maintain the separation of powers. Whatever maintains separation must be some other thing, some kind of "practical security. " 90
The implications of this deceptively simple distinction should not be
underestimated. At present, much of the debate about the separation of
powers rests on the assumption that the proper questions to ask are
questions about the allocation of legal authority: "Is this power properly
located in the judiciary department?" or "Is that power permissible for an
administrative agency?" 91 In these questions resides a serious, yet
unarticulated, inconsistency with Madison's project. Madison's goal was
not to offer an intellectual history of the separation of powers or even to
explain how the Constitutional Convention had arrived at its division of
power. His goal was to assure his readers that the allocation of power
chosen would remain secure in practice-that the Constitution's institutional
design was not only right, but that it would also work.

A.

No. 47: In Search of "Practical Security"

As Federalist No. 47 opens, Madison sings loudly the praises of the
separation of powers. Although no doubt sincere, this veneration was also
purposeful. Madison understood the political stakes, and they were high:
the antifederalists had charged that the proposed Constitution violated the
separation of powers. 92 Such charges were calculated to inflame, difficult
to rebut, and wrapped in a maxim as widely accepted as it was ill-defined.
Aware of the risk, Madison sought to calm his readership and to assure
them that the Framers took seriously the question of separated powers.
And so he embraces the principle warmly and repeatedly, praising this
"celebrated maxim" 93 of government and even conceding that "[w]ere the

89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308. This position is heavily underscored by Madison's rejection
of "parchment barriers" as an impediment to tyranny. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
91. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (addressing the question whether the
Sentencing Commission is properly located in the judiciary department); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988) (addressing the question whether the independent counsel may exercise "executive"
powers).
92. See McDONALD, supra note 24, at 285; WOOD, supra note 24, at 548 (both discussing the
antifederalists' separation of powers claims).
93. THEFEDERALISTNo. 47, at303.
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federal Constitution . . . really chargeable with this accumulation of power,
. . . no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal
reprobation of the system. " 94
Having proclaimed allegiance to the principle of separation, Madison
is left to argue that the "maxim on which [his opponents were relying]
ba[d] been totally misconceived and misapplied. " 95 Madison labors to
give the impression that his dispute with the antifederalists is not very
serious: be argues that his opponents simply misunderstand the "celebrated
Montesquieu. " 96 Montesquieu "did not mean that the departments ought
to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other."97
The "real meaning" of Montesquieu, Madison asserted, was that "the
whole power" of one branch should not rest in "the same bands which
possess the whole power of another department. " 98 Although this passage
is among the most famous in this essay, it is arguably the least convincing
and certainly the most obscure. Read with an emphasis on the phrase
"whole power," Madison's interpretation of Montesquieu suggests that one
department may wield everything but the last ounce of another department's authority. But this interpretation99 cannot go very far before it
runs headlong into arguments made later in the essays. We know, for
example, that neither Madison nor Montesquieu would have sanctioned a
scheme in which the legislative branch wielded anything close to the
"whole" of the executive or judicial power. 100
The contemporary focus on Madison's bow toward Montesquieu bas,
unfortunately, obscured a far more important part of the essay. After
Madison explains that the Constitution's critics have misunderstood

94. Id. at 301.
95. Id.
96. Id. Madison's principal argument here is that Montesquieu approved of the British
Constitution, which did not maintain departments "totally separate and distinct" from each other. Id.
at 302, 302-03.
97. Id. at 302 (emphasis omitted).
98. Id. at 302-03 (emphasis in original).
99. Some, but not all, of the difficulty of this interpretation is eliminated if we shift our focus from
the adjective "whole" to the pl!rase "the same hands," emphasizing those who hold power rather than
the quantum of power held. Throughout the Federalist essays, Madison describes the separation of
powers in terms that focus on those who wield power. See infra notes 330-32 and accompanying text.
Under this view, the statement does not mean that one department may not hold the whole power of
another, but that no person (e.g., a president) within a department may hold the whole power of another department.
100. See, e.g., THE FEDERAI.Isr No. 48, at 309 ("[l]t is against the enterprising ambition of [the
legislative] department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautiona. "); THE FEDERAI.Isr No. 49, at 315-16 ("[T]he tendency of republican governments is to
an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expence of the other departments."); MONTESQUIEU, supra
note 38, at Book XI, ch. 6, at 208 ("But whatever may be the issue of that examination, the legislative
body ought not to have a power of judging the person, nor of course the conduct of him who is
intrusted with the executive power.").
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Montesquieu, he spends the bulk of the essay101 "turning the
tables" 102-pointing out that the critics had conveniently ignored the fact
that their own state constitutions violated the very Montesquieuian principle
they espoused. "If we look into the constitutions of the several States,"
Madison writes, "there is not a single instance in which the several
departments ofpower have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. " 103
Some provide "too great a mixture" of power; others, an "actual
consolidation. " 1~» But, most importantly, "in no instance," -in no state
constitution, Madison writes-"has a competent provision been made for
maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. " 105
Here sits one of the most overlooked clues to The Federalist's
separation of powers and to the practical security Madison ultimately seeks.
At this point in the text, we have no idea what Madison means by a
"competent provision, " 106 but we do know that whatever it is, each state
constitution lacks it-each lacks something essential to "maintain[ ] in
practice the separation delineated on paper. " 107 If we return to the
discussion of the state constitutions and examine each critique, we find that
each shares a peculiar emphasis. Substantive powers are rarely mentioned/08 but every state constitution is criticized extensively for its
arrangement of officeholders. Indeed, references to particular powers are
overwhelmed by references to appointment, removal, and dual officeholding.109 Typical of this discussion is Madison's critique of the

101. George Carey estimates that Madison spends more than half of No. 47 surveying the
constitutions of 11 states. CAREY, supra note 18, at 56.
102. This kind of argument appears frequently throughout 1Jze Federalist. See id. at 56 & n.5
(noting that Madison frequently used the "'glass house' argument: a type of argument ••• designed
to show that the charges against the proposed Constitution could be leveled with far greater justification
against the state constitutions").
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303-04 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The veto power and the pardon power are the principal exceptions to Madison's focus on
officeholders. See, e.g., id. at 304-07.
109. In New Hampshire,
[t]he executive head is himself eventually elective [sic] every year by the legislative
department, and his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same
department. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. And
the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive department.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 304. In Massachusetts, "[t]he members of the judiciary department, again,
are appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of
the two legislative branches." Id. at 305. In New Jersey, "[t]he governor, who is the executive
magistrate, is appointed by the legislature ••• [,]is a member of the Supreme Court ofAppeals, and
president, with a casting vote, of one of the legislative branches." Id. In New York, "[i]n its councU
of appointment members of the legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the
appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary." Id. In Pennsylvania, "the president, who is
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Virginia Constitution. In Virginia, he tells us, "the chief magistrate, with
his executive council, are appointable by the legislature; . . . two members
of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the legislature; and
. . . all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the
same department. " 110
At one level, this kind of critique should seem unexpected. If we are
looking for the modem separation of powers, most of Madison's analysis
seems unremarkable. When we return to the text, we do not find a discussion of powers mixed or functions garbled. Instead, Madison offers us
something else: the attributes of office. And, yet, as we will see, this
reference is only the first to what becomes an exceedingly important ideaan idea that Madison will describe as the "due foundation" 111 for the
separation of powers.

B.

No. 48: Virginia and Parchment Barriers

If No. 47's reference to maintaining "in practice" 112 the separation
of powers seems to the casual reader an isolated, offhand remark, No. 48
leaves no doubt about the phrase's significance. At the opening of No. 48,
Madison warns:

[P]ower is of an encroaching nature and . . . it ought to be
effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After
discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as
they may in their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the
next and nwst difficult task is to provide some practical security for
each, against the invasion of the others.113

head of the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the legislative department
predominates." Id. at 306. In Delaware, "the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the
legislative department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are vice-presidents in the executive
department." Id. In Maryland, "the executive magistrste [is] appointable by the legislative
department." Id. In North Carolina, "the legislative department [appoints] ••• not only • • • the
executive chief, but all the principal officers within both that and thejudiciary department." Id. at 307.
In South Carolina, "the constitution makes the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative
department. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judiciary department,
including even justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive
department •••• " Id. In Georgia, "we find that the executive department is to be filled by
appointments of the legislature." Id. (emphasis added throughout).
For a similar argument made during the ratification debate, see 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HJsrORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: PENNSYLVANIA 560-61 (Merrill Jenson ed., 1976)
[hereinafter RATIFICATION DEBATES] (ststements of James Wilson, Dec. 11, 1787) (criticizing the
separation of powers in the stste constitutions of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, South Carolina,
and North Carolina).
110. THE FEDERAUsrNo. 47, at 307.
111. THEFEDERAUsrNo. 51, at 321.
112. THE FEDERAUsr No. 47, at 308.
113. THE FEDERAUsrNo. 48, at 308 (emphasis added).
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We are left in suspense about what this practical security might be.
Madison tells us only that it is "the great problem to be solved. " 114 Yet,
we are clearly on notice now of its importance-an importance that
becomes clearer as each essay proceeds, as each considers and rejects
solutions precisely because they fail to provide such security.
The :first candidate, considered and rejected in No. 48, seeks to hold
the departments in their place by constitutional boundary. "Will it be
sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments in
the constitution of the government," asked Madison, "and to trust to these
parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power?"115 The
rhetoric betrays the answer: parchment barriers are not enough. Readers
typically stop here, either puzzled by Madison's refusal to recognize the
importance of textual prohibitions or admiring of Madison's skepticism
about their efficacy. Both positions miss the point: Madison's rejection of
boundaried solutions is not a statement of legal theory but a statement of
political experience-constitutional boundaries had already failed to secure
the separation of powers.
Early in No. 48, Madison reminds his readers that, after the
Revolution, a number of states had included in their constitutions express
provisions enjoining separate powers. 116 These provisions were "the
security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers
of most of the American Constitutions. "117 Madison warns that such
provisions have been highly "overrated. " 118 Over time, the states had
come to violate the very injunction to separate power they had once
drafted. At this point, Madison refers his readers to the experience of his
own state, Virginia. Quoting at length from Thomas Jefferson's Notes on
the State of Virginia, Madison explains that Virginia had relied upon an
explicit constitutional provision requiring separate departments, but that this
injunction had been violated time and time again:
All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
result to the legislative body [in the State of Vrrginia]. The
concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of
despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will
be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. . . .
An elective despotism was not the government we fought for
119

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 105.
THE FEDERAUST No. 48, at 308.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310-11 (emphasis in original) (quoting JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 120).
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How bad Virginia arrived so quickly at despotism by the legislature
if its constitution expressly required separate and distinct departments?
Madison's quotation from Notes on the State of Virginia tells us that "no
barrier was provided between these several powers. "120 But this answer
seems unsatisfying. Virginia bad provided a "barrier" in all conventional
legal senses of the term. The Virginia Constitution expressly provided that
"the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate
and distinct. " 121 Indeed, it bad gone even further, barring "any person"
from exercising the "powers of more than one of [the departments] at the
same time. " 122
What, then, does Jefferson mean by his statement that "no barrier was
provided"? The passage that follows this statement strongly suggests that
the barrier mentioned was not a legal barrier, but a barrier against personal
influence and bribery: "The judiciary and the executive members were left
dependent on the legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of
them for their continuance in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes
executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made
123
"
Here, we see quite literally the echoes of the English
opposition and their distrust of dependence and placemen, of political
power corrupted by personal interest. In Virginia, the corruption bad
simply operated in reverse: the legislature bad manipulated the executive
through the executive's attributes of office-salary, removal, and
appointment. As oue commentator put it, the executive possessed "not a
single feature of Independence" because "in Virginia, [it] is chosen, paid,
directed, and removed by the legislature. "174
By gaining the dependence of members of the executive and judicial
branches, the Virginia Assembly obtained indirectly what it could not
achieve directly. The legislature never proclaimed its "right" to judge
cases or execute laws. It achieved that result, however, by manipulating
the appointment, removal, and salary powers of the members of other
departments. In the end, this was a far more effective means of obtaining
power than an open declaration or usurpation. Once a department gains

120. Id. at 311 (emphasis in original) (quoting JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 120).
121. Id.
122. VA. CoNsr. OF 1776, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTlONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3812,3815 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909).
123. THE FEDERAUsrNo. 48, at 311 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
124. SYDNOR, supra note 72, at 87 (quoting ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTlON AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 119 (1803)) (emphasis in
SYDNOR); see 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 203 (statement of Edmund Randolph of
Virginia, June 11, 1787) (arguing that "[t]he Executive & Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding their
nominal independence on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent on them" that they would
never align themselves with the federal government).
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the adherence of the members of another, it need not fear an adverse
reaction: "[N]o opposition is likely to be made .... " 125 The result is
not only structural but also self-perpetuating corruption. By the time of the
Constitutional Convention, political experience had long shown that
parchment barriers would prove no match for those who would seek to
corrupt men, first.
C.

Nos. 49 & 50: Judging One's Own Cause

In Nos. 49 and 50, Madison continues to lead the reader on a search
for practical seeurity by considering two proposals authored by Thomas
Jefferson. In the first, breaches of separation would be resolved by a
constitutional convention whenever two departments would agree to call for
such a convention; 126 in the second, such breaches would be addressed
by periodic constitutional conventionsP7 Ultimately, neither solution
proves satisfactory to Madison, and, once again, Madison premises his
rejection of these proposals upon political "experience."
Both of Jefferson's proposals fail because each poses the same risk
presented in No. 48-the risk that constitutional structure will be
determined by private, not public, interest. In No. 49, the risk comes from
a legislature bent on doing what the Virginia Assembly had done,
"gaining" to itself "the interest" of other departments' members. 128 If
the legislature could bend to its will "even one third of [the] members" of
another department and the two should combine to oppress a third department, Madison explains that the weaker department would "derive no
advantage from Jefferson's remedy. " 129 After all, what use is a constitutional convention subject to" call by two departments if one department
has corrupted the members of another? In No. 50, Jefferson's proposal for
periodic conventions fares no better, again because the proposal offers
incentives to use personal interest to subvert structure. 130 In both cases,
Madison is less concerned about a corrupt bargain between the departments
than he is about the incentives of those likely to be chosen as members of
any body deciding structural questions. Popularly-elected conventions,
Madison argues, will be "composed chiefly of the men" already sitting in
the legislature, men who are "distributed and dwell among the people at
large. " 131 The same "influence which had gained them an election into

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

THE FEDERAUST No. 48,
THEFEDERAUSTNo. 49,
THE FEDERAUST No. 50,
THE FEDERAUSTNo. 49,

at 31 I.
at313.
at 317.
at 314.

Id.
THEFEDERAUSTNo. 50, at317-18.
THE FEDERAUSTNo. 49, at 316.
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the legislature would gain them a seat in the convention. " 132 Placing
these men in the position of constitutional arbiters effectively puts them in
the position of deciding their own cases: legislators will determine whether
acts of structural aggrandizement by the legislature are consistent with the
constitution. 133 In a republic, where structural encroachments are most
likely to come "from the legislative at the expense of the other departments, " 134 such a proposal invites self-interested solutions that provide
little "practical security" against departmental collapse.

D.

No. 51: The "Due Foundation" and Practical Security

As Madison opens his final essay on the separation of powers, he
restates the question he first asked in No. 47: "To what expedient, then,
shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition
of power among the several departments as laid down in the constitution?"135 At this point, we have seen one proposal after another
rejected as insufficient: parchment barriers (No. 48); review by a
constitutional referee (No. 49); and periodic reviews by the people (No.
50). And, still, Madison keeps the reader in suspense. He tells us that
"[t]he only answer that can be given is that as all these exterior provisions
are found to be inadequate," the defect must be supplied by an "interior"
solution. 136 We must so "contriv[e] the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. " 137
This bit of information should disappoint the reader looking for a
discussion of executive, legislative, and judicial power. Nothing in this
opening paragraph even mentions these ideas. We know only that,
whatever solution Madison will propose, it will be one that involves the
"interior structure" of the government and that it will be enforced by the
departments themselves. 138 In the discussion below, I follow Madison's
text as he first describes the "due foundation" for this structure (a part of
the essay that has been largely ignored). I then consider Madison's
ultimate prescription for the "practical security" his essays seek.

132. Id.
133. Id. Madison does allow for the possibility of aggrandizements by other departments but is
still doubtful about whether such disputes could be decided "on the true merits" because the judgment
"would be pronounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of, the measures to
which the decision would relate." Id. at 316-17.
134. Id. at 315-16.
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 320-21.
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1. 'lhe "Due Foundation."-Before Madison is willing to explain his
"interior" solution, he begs for another delay, asking the reader to indulge
a brief paragraph or two to set a "due foundation" for a forthcoming
revelation:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct
exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain
extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of
hoerty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its
own •.•.139

Again, this answer seems calculated more to frustrate than to inform.
Madison has not told modem readers what they expect to hear-that the
"due foundation" for the separation of powers is a question of powers or
functions or checks. Rather, he tells us that it depends upon something
called "the will" of a department.
Although Madison never stops to define this will of the department,
his text speaks almost immediately of the persons who run the departments:
"LJ]t is evident that each department should have a Ylill of its own; and
consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have
as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the
others. " 140 This reference to appointment-which seems at initial glance
to be a digression-is the first of a series of crescendoed references to the
attributes of office. From appointment, Madison moves on to removal and
salary, arguing that tenure and salary protection are more than enough to
protect the judiciary from dependence upon those who appoint thym. 141
Madison adds that "[i]t is equally evident that the members of each
department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others
for the emoluments annexed to their offices. " 142
The reader looking for powers and forms and functions is liable to
skip over this passage, believing that the author has digressed. Modernity
tends to resist the kind of anthropomorphism suggested by a departmental
"will." In the eighteenth century, however, many believed that "the
institutions of government were analogous to the individual's faculties of
mind. " 143 The "will" of a department was thus analogous to the will of

139. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. Madison acknowledges in an earlier essay that this is one of the facts from wltich the
legislative department "derives a superiority." See THE FEDERALJsr No. 48, at 310 ("[A]s the
legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full
discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the pecuniazy rewards of those who :fill the other
departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, wltich gives still greater facility to
encroachments of the former.").
143. Daniel W. Howe, 'Ihe Language of Faculty Psychology in The Federalist Papers, in
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE, supra note 27, at 107, 120.
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an individual. A department with a "will" was one that possessed the
potential for independent choice, the ability to take action without corrupt
or coercive influence. As the English Whig Trenchard put it, a House of
Commons corrupted by places, pensions, and bribes was a political body
without a "will. " 144 Given this context, Madison's emphasis on the
attributes of office becomes more apparent. Madison writes that the "will"
of the department depends upon the independence of departmental
members. 145 The independence of persons, in turn, depends upon protecting the attributes of office-salary, tenure, and appointment-from
corrupt interference by other departments. In short, just as an individual's
will is not his own if he is bound, by interest or threat, to another, a
department's will is not its own if its members are subject to claims or
interests of other departments.
To put this in more modern terms, Madison relied upon what is, in the
end, most immediate and important to persons-their livelihood-to provide
a "due foundation" for the separation of powers. Even today, it is an
article of faith that the power to remove officers is one of the most
important political powers residing in any government: the power to cut
short an employee's tenure creates the power to force an employee to
cleave to the policies of the institution holding the removal power. The
same goes for salary and appointment powers. To render individual
members of one department "dependent" upon another for their daily pay
is to create the opportunity that "subsistence" may be withheld to obtain
special favors or changes of position.146 Similarly, the power to appoint
carries with it the hope of future concessions from the appointee.
Here, for the first time, we have an important clue to the "interior
structure" that Madison has promised: to protect the institution, one must
protect the persons within the institution. Private interest must not dictate
public interest. Thus, individual officers should be as independent147 as
possible from influence by other branches when it comes to matters in
which their personal interest may obscure their public duties. And that
means security for persons-the security from fear that one's livelihood

144. TRENCHARD, supra note 46, at 140-41.
145. THE FEDERALisr No. 51, at 321.
146. Although Congress retains the power of the purse, it may not use that power to diminish the
salary of the president or members of the judiciary while those individuals remain in office. U.S.
CoNsr. art. ll, § 1, cl. 7; art. ill, § 1. And, although Congress seta the "terms" for offices, it may
not punish a particular officer by reducing her salary. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of
Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.").
147. By the term "independent," I borrow the Madisonian usage, not the contemporary usage
associated with the term "independent" agencies. "Independence," in the sense I am using it here,
means independence from the corrupt influence of other departments (inter-departmental independence),
not independence from political influences within a department (intra-departmental independence). For
more on this subject, see infra notes 355-87 and accompanying text.
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will be at risk if one pursues the obligations of office. "Dependence"
might be achieved by any one of a number of factors (for example, the
power of appointment, the power to remove, or the power to determine
individuals' salaries). 148 At the same time, "independence" might be
achieved through a combination of features. 149 The key in each case is
whether the attributes of office, viewed as a whole, give officeholders a
personal incentive to maintain or subvert the public mission of their
departments.
Madison's argument that the departments should have a "will" of their
own was neither an isolated reference, nor an odd tum of phrase: we see
it foreshadowed in each of the preceding essays. In No. 47, we see
Madison's claim that the state constitutions had failed to "maintain[ ] in
practice the separation delineated on paper" because they "mixe[d]"
appointment, removal, and salary provisions, permitting one to control the
appointment and removal of the members of other departments. 150 In
No. 48, Madison elaborates on this critique and focuses on Virginia, where
the legislature had held the executive in check by manipulating its
"subsistence" and "continuance" in office.m And in Nos. 49 and 50,
we see Madison's wariness of solutions that pose a risk that private interest
will determine constitutional structure. 152
These essays, with their focus on "officers and offices, " 153 reflect
basic understandings of the time about the nature of politics and political
incentives. Both proponents and opponents of the Constitution were heirs
to a political discourse in which "dependent" officers figured prominently.154 The Whig opposition taught the Framers the destructive power
of the English placemen, who sat in Parliament but were allegiant to the
King. 155 The objection to "dependent" officers was not only an intellec-

148. See, e.g., THE FEDERAUsr No. 48, at 310-11 (describing the "dependence" of executive
officers under the Virginia Constitution created by a control over tenure and subsistence).
149. See, e.g., THE FEDERAUsr No. 51, at 321 (describing how the judiciary's appointment by
other departments does not render it "dependent" on those departments because of its tenure and salary
protections).
150. THE FEDERAUsr No. 47, at 308, 304, 303-08.
151. THE FEDERAUsrNo. 48, at 310-11 (quoting JEFFERSON, supra note 17, at 120).
152. THE FEDERAUsr No. 49, at 316-17; THE FEDERAUsr No. SO, at 319; see supra text
accompanying notes 126-34.
153. Qf. James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 22, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 254, 255 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979) [hereinafter PAPERS
OF MADISON] ("[I]f there is any point in which the separation of the legislative and executive powers
ought to be maintained with greater caution, it is that which relates to officers and offices.").
154. See supra text accompanying notes 42-72.
155. References to the corruption of the British placemen appear throughout Madison's notes of
the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 86 (statement of
John Dickenson of Delaware, June 2, 1787) ("In the British Govt. itself the weight of the Executive
arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its
prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must look out for something else."); 1 id. at 99
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tual position, but also a political fear, repeatedly expressed during the
Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates. 156 Federalists and
antifederalists alike entreated their colleagues to preserve the
"independence" of those who would wield the power of government. 157
Of course, the "independence" that Madison admired was only
partially fulillled in the Constitution.158 The Senate's advice and consent
power and Congress's impeachment power are two obvious reminders that
the Constitution authorizes departments to exercise control over individual
members of other departm.ents. 159 Madison knew that the Constitution

(statement of Benjamin Fmnklin of Pennsylvania, June 4, 1787) ("It was true the King of G.B. had
not, As was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution: but that matter was easily explained. The
bribes and emoluments now given to the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary ••.• "); 1 id.
at 380-81 (statement of George Mason of Virginia, June 22, 1787) ("!admire many parts of the British
constitution and government, but I detest their corruption. - Why has the power of the crown so
remarkably increased the last century? A stmnger, by reading their laws, would suppose it considembly diminished; and yet, by the sole power of appointing the increased officers of government,
corruption pervades every town and village in the kingdom."); see also 1 id. at 101 (statement of
George Mason of Virginia, June 4, 1787) (referring to the role of "bribery & influence" in the
workings of the British executive); 1 id. at 387 (statement of George Mason of Virginia, June 23, 1787)
(mentioning "the abuses & corruption in the British Parliament, connected with the appointment of its
members"); 1 id. at 376 (statement of Pierce Butler of South Carolina, June 22, 1787) (arguing that
in Great Britain, "the source of the corruption that ruined the[] Govt." was that "men got into
Parl[iament] that they might get offices for themselves or their friends"); 1 id. at 391 (statement of
Pierce Butler of South Carolina, June 23, 1787) (discussing George ll's pmctice of giving his
opponents other offices or pensions in order to silence the opposition).
156. See, e.g., FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 23, at 76 ("If he [a senator]
places his future prospects in the favours and emoluments of the geneml government, he will become
the dependant and creature of the President, as the system enables a senator to be appointed to offices
[sic] •.. ; as such, he will favour the wishes of the President, and concur in his measures •••• "
(quoting Luther Martin's Genuine Infonnation, MARYLAND GAZETIE, Jan. 8, 1788) (emphasis
omitted)); 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 109, at 567 (statement of James Wilson, Dec. 11, }787
("To have the executive officers dependent upon the legislative would certainly be a violation of that
principle so necessary to preserve the freedom of republics, that the legislative and executive powers
should be sepamte and independent.").
157. See, e.g., 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 109, at 508 (statement of John Smilie, Dec.
6, 1787) (presenting the antifedemlists' argument that the Senate's power of appointment was a "share
in the executive department" and, as such, would "corrupt the legislature" and "make the President
merely a tool to the Senate"); DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION (Dec. 18, 1787),
reprinted in 2 id. at 634 (arguing that "the judges of the courts of Congress would not be independent,
as they are not debarred from holding other offices during the pleasure of the president and senate, and
as they may derive their support in part from fees alterable by the legislature" (emphasis added)). For
references to the importance of the "independence" of officers at the Constitutional Convention, see
supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
158. For example, Madison saw the Senate's role in appointing executive bmnch officers as an
"exception" to be narrowly construed. See infra text accompanying notes 242-44; 12 PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 153, at 233 (noting this "exception").
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing that the Senate shall tcy impeachments);
art. n, § 2, cl. 2 (allowing the president to appoint officers "by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate"); art. ll, § I, cl. 3 (giving the House of Representatives the power to choose the president
in case no candidate has a majority of votes of the electors); art. n, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the
Justices of the Supreme Court are to be named by the president "by and with the Advice and Consent
HeinOnline -- 74 Tex. L. Rev. 475 1995-1996

476

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 74:447

did not adhere to the principle of independence with "theoretical
precision" 160 and that these failures were the product of political
compromise. 161 And, yet, he and others firmly believed that the
independence principle was "more strictly adhered to" in the federal
constitution than it had ever been before-in the British Constitution, in
any of the state constitutions and, indeed, as James Wilson was to put it at
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, "in any other system of government
in the world. "162
Today, this is difficult to see because the powers that allow a
department to influence individual officeholders across departmental linesthe power to confirm appointments or to impeach executive officers-are
often scenes of enormous political and constitutional conflict. Placed in
historical perspective, however, these powers offer opportunities for
influence across departmental lines that pale compared to a multitude of
provisions that the Constitutional Convention considered and rejected. 163
We might have inherited a Constitution in which the president was elected

of the Senate"). Constitutional omissions such as the lack of an incompatibility clause barring service
by judges in the executive branch also create opportunities for cross-departmental influence. See
Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 19, at 1122-29, 1131-33 (emphasizing the Constitution's failure to
provide an incompatibility clause barring federal judges from serving in the executive branch).
160. 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 109, at 561 (statement of lames Wilson, Dec. 11,
1787).
161. At first glance, Madison appears to have violated this principle himself in his proposal for
a council of revision. See 1 FEDERAL CoNVENTION, supra note I, at 74 (statement of lames Madison
of Virginia, lune 1, 1787) (expressing his opinion that "an Executive formed of one Man would answer
the purpose when aided by a Council, who should have the right-to advise and record their proceedings, but not to control his authority"). It is important to remember, however, that the council was
proposed as a counterbalance to the legislature when the president was to be appointed by, and hence
"dependent upon," the legislature. 1 id. at 70-71 (lune 1, 1787).
162. 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 109, at 561 (statement of lames Wilson, Dec. 11,
1787); see THE FEDERALisr No. 47 (asserting that the Constitution embodies the independence
principle more fully than either the British Constitution or the state constitutions). In this sense,
Madison understood that the institutional design of the Constitution was, to use Neil Komesar's term,
a question of "imperfect alternatives." See generally NEIL KoMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, EcONOMICS, AND PUBUC POUCY (1994).
163. A variety of important structural provisions ensures the independence of those who hold
government power: U.S. CONSJ'. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for the election of the House of
Representatives by means independent of the other departments-"by the People"); art. I, § 3, cl. 1
(providing for the election of senators by means independent of the other departments-by the state
legislatures); art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (specifying that the removal of members of Congress is to be determined
by Congress itself); art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (allowing congressional salaries to be determined by Congress "by
Law"); art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (separating the members of the executive and legislative departmenta by
declaring that no member of Congress shall be an executive officer and no executive officer shall be
a member of Congress); art. ll, § 1, cis. 2-3 (establishing that the president is to be elected by means
independent of the other departments-by a system of "Electors"); art. n, § 1, cl. 7 (limiting
Congress's power to reduce or increase the president's salary); art. IT, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing the
president to appoint his own executive officers); art. m, § 1 (granting life tenure and salary protections
to judges).
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by Congress164 or in which members of the Senate were elected by the
House. 165 These proposals, and others, were considered and rejected at
the Constitutional Convention because they created an improper structural
"dependency" of one department upon another66-a dependency that
offers far more opportunity for abuse than any of the cross-departmental
connections that remain today.
Experience under the state constitutions had taught Madison and his
generation that even the clearest of constitutional injunctions to separate
power could not survive internal corruption. No particular division of
powers or functions would work in practice if those who wielded the
power had an interest in subverting that division. No boundaries defining
the powers or the forms of the departments would achieve separation in
practice if those who wielded the power had an interest in leaping those
boundaries. No check or balance would prevent the violation of separation
in practice if the persons who controlled the branches had no incentive to
assert such checks. Disintegration and collapse would be as inevitable as
they were in England and the American colonies. It was this political fate
that Madison hoped might be avoided by a "due foundation" resting
squarely, if not perfectly, on the "independence" of persons.

2. "Practical Security" Explained.-Now that we have seen that
Madison's "foundation" rests upon independent offices, we are capable of
completing the picture Madison has promised since Federalist No. 47-a
picture of the "practical security" that will maintain the separation of
powers. Only with this foundation in place is it possible to see that
Madison's ultimate solution cannot be described in the conventional terms
of checks, or shared powers, or functional divisions. In what follows, I
tum to the remainder of the essay's argument and its ultimate reliance on
the "foundation" built at the beginning of the essay.
Having laid the groundwork for his final argument, Madison proceeds
to explain that independence is necessary but not sufficient to secure the

164. The Virginia Plan provided "that a National Executive be instituted; to he chosen by the
National Legislature for the term of [blank] years •••• " 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at
21 (May 29, 1787) (recording the resolutions proposed by Edmund Randolph of VU"ginia). "The
Convention [attendees] ••• were perplexed with no part of this plan so much as with the mode of
choosing the President of the United States." 2 RATIFICATION DEBATES, supra note 109, at 566-67
(statement of James WJ.lson, Dec. 11, 1787).
165. The Virginia Plan provided that "the members of the second branch [the Senate] ••• be
elected by those of the first [the House]." 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note I, at 20 (May 29,
1787) (recording the resolutions proposed by Edmund Randolph of Virginia).
166. 1 id. at 80-81 (June 2, 1787); 1 id. at 174-76 (June 9, 1787) (both documenting concerns
about the dependence of the executive upon Congress if the executive were to be chosen by Congress);
1 id. at 152 (June 7, 1787) (documenting concerns about the dependence of the Senate on the House
if senators were to be eleeted by the House).
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separation of powers: "But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. " 167 This
union of "means" and "motives" is explained in one of the most famous,
and most difficult, passages in The Federalist:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? 168

The crucial line here is Madison's statement that "[t]he interest of the man
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place." The trouble
comes with the term "interest." What is the "interest of the man" that
Madison has sought to bind to his place? No other single word in The
Federalist has led to as much confusion and inspired such wildly differing
understandings of the document. From Charles Beard's interpretation of
"interest" as "economic self-interest"169 to modern pluralists' adoption
of "interest" as the rough equivalent of modern "interest groups," 170
much has hung upon the meaning of this phrase. 171 Unfortunately, this
otherwise lively debate has left us without a common understanding of
"interest, " 172 a crucial element in our analysis of the union of "means"
and "motives" that Madison believed necessary to guard against the
concentration of power.
Historians and political scientists tell us that in the eighteenth century,
"mterest" was a far more active psychological principle than we imagine

167. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22.
168. Id. at 322.
169. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN EcoNOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 17, 14-18 (rev. ed. 1943) (arguing that the Constitution was the product of "a group
of economic interests which must have expected beneficial results from its adoption"). Although
Professor Beard's specific thesis may have been overdrawn, his more general point that the Constitution
was the "product of human behavior and human decisionmaking" remains a crucial twentieth-century
insight from which much modem scholarship has proceeded. See Neil K. Komesar, Paths of
Influence-Beard Revisited, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 124, 124 (1987).
170. See DAHL, supra note 40, at 22, 20-22.
171. For an explanation of the importance of both majoritarian and minoritarian "interests" to the
Framers, see KOMESAR, supra note 162, at 217-20 (explaining the federalists' concern about potential
majoritarian excesses and the antifederalists' concern about minoritarian bias).
172. See, e.g., MORTON WHITE, PHILoSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 105-12
(1987) (distinguishing between "interest," "economic interest," and Madison's use of the word
"interest" to mean "the general desire for ultimate happiness"); WIU.S, supra note 18, at 201-07
(asserting that "interest" is used in The Federalist as a pejorative term akin to "ambition").
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today. 173 One with an "interest" in something was believed likely to act
in accordance with that interest. A typical "interest" was a bond or
attachment. One was presumed to act in accordance with persons who
shared or enforced one's "interest"; for example, the placemen were
"governed by interest" because they were bound to the King. 174 At the
same time, an "interest" might be used to refer to the bond or attachment
itself; thus, mixed government theory taught that it was the balance of
"interests" that maintained stability, referring to economic and social bonds
of the monarchy, the aristocracy, and the commons. 175
What, then, does Madison mean when he urges that the interest of the
man must be connected to the constitutional rights of the place? Put in
modem terms, Madison is describing a phenomenon we might today describe as "allegiance." The members of any institution-whether political,
commercial, or educational-typically come to identify with the institutions
they serve. Today, we see this frequently: the presidential candidate who
decries the excesses of executive power but who, once in office, refuses to
cede even the slightest constitutional authority; the congressional candidate
who decries congressional investigatory power but later initiates a broadreaching investigation. Each of these actors, upon becoming a member of
the institution he once criticized, eventually allies himself with the
"interests" of his institution.
Although I have described the concept in modem terms, Madison's
idea is firmly grounded in eighteenth-century political psychology. When
Madison speaks of governing man by his own "ambition," he speaks as a
man of his philosophical generation. The echoes of the philosopher David
Hume are as unmistakable in No. 51 as they are in No. 10.176 When
Madison takes man's less-than-angelic character as an axiom of
government, he mimics Hume's assumption that "in contriving any system
of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the
constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave. " 177 When

173. On the eighteenth-century idea of "interest," see generally ALBERT 0. HIRscHMAN, THE
PASSIONS AND THE INTEREsTs: POUTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPJTAUSM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 38, 3148 (1977) (concluding that eighteenth-century philosophers narrowed the meaning of "interest" to the
pursuit of material, economic advantage) and Stephen Holmes, The Secret History of Self-Interest, in
BEYOND SELF-INTEREsT 267 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (analyzing seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury philosophers' understanding of "interest" both as one motive among others and as the
fundamental motor propelling all human efforts).
174. HUME, supra note34, at 51.
175. As Hume and others taught, "interest" was essential to fidelity to government. WILLS, supra
note 18, at 31 (explaining Hume's belief that shared interest lead humans to form governments).
176. Historian Douglass Adair discovered Madison's debt to Hume in his famous analysis of
Federalist No. 10, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science": David Hume, James Madison, and
tile Tenth Federalist (1957), reprinted in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra note 22, at 93,
97-106.
177. HUME, supra note 34, at 42 (emphasis omitted). This was, of course, a common feature of
much thought during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See, e.g., GWYN, supra note 26,
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Madison extends that assumption such that "[a]mbition must be made to
counteract ambition, " 178 Hume finishes the thought: "By this [private]
interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to the public
good. " 179 Making Humean "bad men ... act for the public good"180
is precisely the goal of Madison's "policy of supplying by opposite and
rival interests, the defect of better motives. " 181 To connect the interest
of the man to the rights of the- place is to put a bond between person and
institution182 in the service of a public goal, namely separated
departments, so that, as Madison puts it, "the private interest of every
individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. " 183
The allegiance of person to place provides not only "hydraulic
pressure," which pushes each department to maintain its powers, but also
the internal force restraining the departments from openly destroying each
other. Individuals, allied to the branches, seek to further the "rights" of
the institution to which they are allied, expanding their power as they assert
those rights. At the same time, however, each department must take into
account the idea that its rivals have precisely the same incentives and
interests. If you know that your rival for power may wield power in
return, power that may destroy you, you think twice before picking a
fight. 184 This "anticipation of antagonism" provides a powerful motive
"Ambition . . . counteract[ing]
that restrains overt usurpation. 185

at 23 ("Men are so subject to vices, and passions, that they stand in need of some restraint in every
condition; but especially when they are in power." (quoting ALGERNON SYDNEY, Discourses
Concerning Government, in THE WORKS OF ALGERNON SYDNEY (1772))); TRENCHARD, supra note 46,
at 138 ("It is certain that every Man will act for his own Interest; and all wise Governments are
founded upon that Principle: So that this whole Mystery is only to make the Interest of the Governors
and Governed the same.").
178. THEFEDERAUSTNo. 51, at322.
179. HUME, supra note 34, at 42.
180. Id. at 16.
181. THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 322 (emphasis added).
182. Hume believed that one of the most politically important affections was an "'imaginary
interest,' whereby individuals attach themselves psychologically to a leader whom they will never meet
and from whom they can expect no material benefits." Holmes, supra note 173, at 273.
183. THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 322 (emphasis added). The idea that one should recruit the
passions of ambition and avarice in the service of a greater good was not, of course, limited to Hume.
It was a staple of much political theory of the day. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 173, at 14-20
(surveying various views on repressing and harnessing the passions).
184. As Professor Charles Black puts it: the president knows that "Congress, given the will, could
put the White House up at auction." Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American
Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 18 (1974). Not surprisingly, the president has
traditionally picked his fights. On power relationships and institutional design, see generally KOMESAR,
supra note 162, at 196-231.
185. Judith N. Shklar, Publius and the Science of the Past, 86 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293 (1977).
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ambition" and "opposite and rival interests" 186 tell a tale not only of
vigor but also of self-restraint.
This reading fits well with Madison's plea for an "interior" solution
to the problem of separated powers. The impulse to separate comes from
within the departments: powered by the allegiance of individuals, each
department pushes outward and expands to the limits of its power.
Imagine that the departments were parts of a machine-as the Framers
were wont to do187-and that each part represented an expandable
chamber sharing a wall with another part. In such a scheme, each
chamber's internal expansion serves to limit the reach of the power of its
coordinate branch. Interest fuels both this hydraulic pressure and its
restraint by expanding the chamber to limits set by the expansion of
neighbor chambers. In such a scheme, the interior structure of the
departments has been "so contrived" that its "several constituent parts may,
by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places. "188
A crucial feature of this plan is the role of interest-a feature few
notice today. It is easy to misread 'Ihe Federalist as expressing the idea
that the departments will check each other's power. But the policy
Madison advocates is not orte supplying opposite and rival departmental
powers; it is a policy of supplying "opposite and rival interests." 189
Context shows that Madison used these words differently: the "policy" is
one of supplying "the defect of better motives," not powers; it is justified
as a commqn way of dividing and arranging "offices," not powers; and it
is intended, in the end, to ensure that private interest may be a "sentinel
over the public rights" of the place. 190 When modem readers collapse
the ambition of the department and the individual officeholder, they skip
a crucial step. They miss the importance of the interests of the individual
officeholder and, as a result, fail to see the importance of the protections
for that interest contained in Madison's "due foundation."
This reading not only provides the missing "interior" solution, but it
also explains why Madison expends so much effort in the early part of the
essay discussing the "due foundation." Divided allegiance makes it
impossible for the "constituent parts" of the government to "keep each

186. THB FEDERAUsr No. 51, at 322.
187. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THB CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 17 (1986) (quoting Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, who both referred to
government as "the great machine"); see also WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
IN THB UNITED STATES 54, 54-55 (1947) (arguing that the Framers based their theory of "political

dynamics" on an "unconscious copy of the Newtonian theory of the universe").
188. THB FEDERAUsr No. 51, at 320.
189. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).

190. Id.
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other in their proper places. "191 Consider the State of Virginia, where
the legislature maintained control of the executive department by
controlling individual members' subsistence and tenure. Because of that
divided allegiance, the executive in Virginia could not "expand" to assert
its constitutional rights despite an express constitutional provision
demanding separate powers. The lesson of Virginia was clear: a
government can have a perfectly drawn system on paper, but it will not
prevent the departments from converging if individuals' allegiances to those
departments are not secure.
Madison's "practical security" stands on the shoulders of many
eighteenth-century beliefs and fears. The genius of No. 51 does not lie in
its consistency with any known theory or philosophy of the separation of
powers, but in the ease with which Madison strikes a new American
version of the separation of powers. In No. 51, Madison took Hume's
premises about human nature, but adopted Bolingbroke's political
solutions. 192 He accepted the idea that men were knaves and concluded
that the independence, rather than dependence, of persons was a crucial
foundation for the separation of powers. He took Blackstone's mixed
government theory and married it to Trenchard's republicanism, replacing
mixed government's idea of warring social and economic interestsinterests incompatible with the new republic-with warring offices and
departments. All of this, ultimately, was placed in the service of a single
goal-that the "distribution and organization of [the Constitution's]
powers" would limit the "dependence" of one department upon the other
and better "secure the dependence of the Govt. on the will of the nation"
as a whole. 193

3. The Separation of Powers "Working. ".-This reading of The
Federalist, with its emphasis on personal incentives and institutional
allegiance, will frustrate modem ears straining for the sound of definition.
In part, this frustration reflects an unstated commitment to a particular idea
of political power, a point that I argue hi detail in Part IV. This frustration
also reflects, however, the difference in our self-assigned tasks: for
Madison, the key was to create a system that would "work," that would
191. Id. at 320.
192. Bolingbroke, and his followers, argued strongly against a system in which the King could
enforce dependence on the Parliament by the selling of "places." See supra note 35. By contrast,
Hume argued that "dependence" was essential to maintain liberty. See HUME, supra note 34, at 45
("We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious
appellations of cormption and dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from
the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government."
(emphasis in original)).
193. James Madison, Note to his Speech on the Right of Suffrage (1821), in 3 FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 28, at 451.
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avoid the failures of the state constitutions and the Articles of
Confederation. Today, the question is no longer whether our government
works, but whether our system remains legitimate-whether governmental
innovations remain consistent with constitutional principle. 194 This
search, aimed as it is at courts and driven by the perceived need for
legitimacy, seeks certainty in consistency, definition, and classification.
Madison found no security in definition or classification;195 the
dangers he perceived to governmental structure were political, not
categorical. Personal and political corruption had destroyed the departmental separation mandated by state constitutions. Madison intended to
ensure, to the extent possible, that the institutional structure of the federal
government would prevent similar dependencies. Once this structure was
in place, and the danger of gradual or secret encroachments had been
minimized, 196 controversy over the distribution of power would be driven
into the open. Freed of personal interest, political power would become
less a commodity-a thing to be bartered based on one's "interest" in
power-than a matter of popular will. 197 By taking away private incentives for departmental usurpation, Madison hoped to bring structural
controversies out into the open where all could judge. 198
Madison was willing to tolerate a political battleground for the
separation of powers as long as no branch could rig the rules, cast the play
themselves, corrupt the decision before the argument. Naively or not,
Madison believed that the system would be largely self-regulating, that any
department that sought openly to steal another's power would be met with
swift reprisals, both popular and institutional.199 However unrealistic this
might seem in theory, experience has tended to bear out Madison's faith
that a system based on independence and political allegiance would sustain
separation, even though it might still leave us guessing about questions of
classification, functional overlap, and legitimacy. Surely, we have seen

194. See, e.g., Carter, Improprieties, supra note 13, at 357 ("[T]he courts in structural cases
should act as referees, and their proper role in determining the legitimacy of an institutional innovation
is rigid enforcement of the rules.").
195. THE FliDERALisr No. 37, at 228-29 (expressing skepticism about ever being able to define
departmenrelboundarie~.

196. See THE FliDERALisr No. 48, at 311 (noting the ability of legislatures to "mask"
encroachments "on the co-ordinate departments"); THE FliDERALisr No. 51, at 322 (arguing that the
legislative power's necessary "predominat[ion]" will be remedied by bicameralism and a partial alliance
between the Senate and the executive).
197. Pocock, supra note 27, at 63-65.
198. See ROBERT I. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONsriTUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
34 (1988) (arguing that Madison wanted to prevent interbranch "encroachment" which "is a subtle and
largely invisible process").
199. Id.; see THE FliDERALisr No. 51, at 322-23 (asserting that the rival departments will defend
against power aggrandizement and that the multitude of interests in society will act as a separate
safeguard).
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presidents, Congresses, and courts grab power. But two hundred years
after The Federalist was written, the departments do retain identifiably
different institutional identities. This is nowhere more clear than within
those institutions: just ask the people who run the departments in the White
House, Congress, and the courts. Ask them who they work for; ask them
who their constituencies are; and ask them what they think of their rival
departments. 200 If you listen, you will hear the separation of powers
"working."
ill. The Federalist Through Modem Lenses: Checks, Shared Powers, and
Functional Division

The story I have told differs rather markedly from the stories
traditionally told about The Federalist. In the course of this retelling, I
have deliberately avoided tenns typically used to describe the separation of
powers, such as "checks and balances," "shared powers," or "functional
division." In this Part, I explain that choice, arguing that each of these
canonical understandings leaves us with a partial and often misleading view
of the separation of powers. As I explain more fully in Part IV, checks,
shared powers, and functional division all disappoint for the same reason:
each has neutralized the idea of power, bleaching it of persons and politics,
leaving a separation of powers built upon a sterile, contradictory
description of law and function.
A.

Checks and Balances

The term "checks and balances" sums up our most common ideal of
the separation of powers. Not surprisingly, it has come to be associated
with Madison's Federalist essays on the separation of powers.201
Although the phraseology is slightly anachronistic, Madison did believe that
the departments should be granted powers of self-defense.202 The idea

200. I do not mean to suggest by this that the departments are either organized or unified. It is
no doubt true that members of independent executive, judicial, or congressional agencies may, on
particular matters, find it hard to identify their constituency or their boss. Granting that, however, it
still seems plausible to me that the vast majority of departmental officials, including those who work
for independent agencies, are very rarely confused about the identity of their institutional rivals. (The
capitol police, for example, are not likely to think that they work for the White House, and members
of the Federal Trade Commission are not likely to think that they work for Congress.)
201. Literally hundreds of references to Madison and checks and balances appear in cases,
treatises, and law review articles. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 470 (1972)
(Rehnquist, 1., dissenting) (quoting Federalist No. 51 to clarify the purpose behind the system of
checks and balances); GWYN, supra note 26, at 3 (attributing to Madison the practice of writing "of
political checks and balances rather than the separation of powers"); Calabresi & Prakssh, supra note
13, at 568 n.69 (stating that Madison defends "the wisdom of checks and balances" in 1he Federalist
(quotingTHEFEDERALISTNO. 37, at228)).
202. Madison was far more partial to the term "defense" or "defensive power." See, e.g., THB
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (stating that "[t]he provision for defense" against "a gradual
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is simple enough: when one department exceeds its powers, a rival department will use its specified constitutional authority to bring the first
department back into line. In this sense, the paradigmatic checking power
is the presidential veto, which allows the executive to reject, and thus
restrain, excess legislative zeal.
Although common, this vision of Madison's theory has also proved
troubling: if pushed, it seems either to swallow or to erase the idea of
separation. If checks do the work of separation, then what independent
purpose does the ideal of separation serve?203 Perhaps we simply have
a government of "checks. "21» But this position raises further questions.
"Checks and balances have to do with the corrective invasion of the
separated powers . . . ." 205 At this point, the checks advocate finds
herself struggling: separation has been replaced by checks that have, in
turn, been defined as departmental trespass. Where, she asks, has all the
separation gone?
Despite the prevalence of the "checks" interpretation, my rereading
suggests that Madison's essays cannot stand alone on a "checks" theory.
Indeed, I believe that the essays themselves show why a system based on
"checks" alone would fail. From Nos. 47 through 50, Madison's message
is insistent: defensive power, power delineated on paper, is only as good
as the structural incentives created to protect the independence of those
who wield that power. So-called "checking powers" offer us no
protection-indeed they may even encourage departmental collapse-if
those who wield them have a personal incentive to undermine separate
institutional identities. 206 At best, checks represent a necessary, rather
than a sufficient, description of the Madisonian separation of powers.
This argument first appears in No. 47, although it is hidden in
Madison's commentary on the state constitutions. Madison concludes his
analysis by telling us that "in no instance" had any state produced a
"competent provision" for "maintaining in practice the separation
delineated on paper. "m This indictment-indeed Madison's entire
concentration of the several powers" shall "be commensurate to the danger of attack"); id. at 322 ("[l]t
is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense.") (emphasis added
throughout). The term "check" alone appears only once in Federalist Nos. 47-51, and then in
conjunction with the idea of separate "offices," not powers. Id. at 322.
203. See Merrill, supra note 13, at 232 (noting that modem views on the separation of powers
become "indistinguishable from a free-floating checks and balances" theory).
204. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 13, at 177-79 (arguing that the checking function is the
essential "principle" of the separation of powers).
205. WILLS, supra note 18, at 119 (emphasis in original). Madison acknowledges this dilemma
in his famous statement that the Constitution requires sufficient blending that each department may have
a "constitutional control" over the others. THE FEDERALisr No. 48, at 308. For a complete discussion
of this statement, see infra notes 234-44 and accompanying text.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 213-15.
207. THB FEDERALisr No. 47, at 308; see supra subpart ll(A) (explicating No. 47).
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analysis of the state constitutions-makes very little sense if we believe that
Madison's "solution" lay in checking powers alone. If "checks" were the
measure of practical security, why would every state have failed to provide
a "competent provision" for maintaining separation? Several of the state
constitutions Madison analyzed in No. 47 included powers we now
associate with "checks," including the executive "veto power. " 208
Madison did not single out for applause those state constitutions with
checking powers, nor did he single out for criticism those without such
powers. Instead, he described each, at least implicitly, as improperly
melding powers and persons in ways that permitted the state legislatures to
corrupt and control the members of other departments. 209 If "checking
powers" really were Madison's candidate for practical security, his analysis
of the state constitutions never reveals it.
No. 48 makes the point even more clearly. There, Madison reminds
us that, despite all precautions, including express constitutional barriers,
the state legislatures had made substantial encroachments on executive
power. In Virginia, the "judiciary and the executive members were left
dependent on the legislative for their subsistence in office, and some of
them for their continuance in it. " 210 The danger had not been created by
the delineation of power on paper; the danger was created because those
in power had no incentive to maintain separation. If the legislature were
to assume "executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be
made .... " 211 Checks in the hands of a "dependent" executive or
judiciary were of no use because they would not be used. 212
Indeed, checks may become tools to undermine the separation of
powers. During the Constitutional Convention, Madison and others voiced
considerable fear that the presidential veto, for example, would not be used
and that disuse might lead to usurpations by the legislature.213 Others
feared that it could be abused: Dr. Franklin explained that "[h]e had some
experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the
proprietary Government of [Pennsylvania where t]he negative of the

208. Massachusetts had given its governor a conditional veto, and New York had granted this
power to its council. THE FEDERAUsr No. 47, at 304-0S. Madison also refers to other so-called
checks provided for by state constitutions, such as the impeachment power. See id. at 304-07.
209. Id. at 304-08.
210. THE FEDERAUsrNo. 48, at 311.

211. Id.
212. A similar argument appears in Nos. 49 and SO, in which Madison warns that any proposal
to decide constitutional breaches will be distorted ifleft to those who have an "interest" in the outcome.
THE FEDERAUsr No. 49, at 317; THE FEDERAUsr No. SO, at 318-20; see supra subpart II(C).
213. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note I, at 107 (statement of]ames Madison of Virginia, June
4, 1787) (questioning whether the veto power would be used "because no man will dare exercise it
[when] the law was passed almost unanimously").
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Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. "214 According
to Franklin:
No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain
with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always
made a condition [of the veto]; till at last it became the regular
practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along
with the bills to be signed . . . .215

The lesson is the same here as we have seen before, only in reverse:
checking powers may be used as much to usurp as to defend if the persons
who wield them have the means and the incentive to use them for personal
advantage.
Finally, the checking theory fits uncomfortably with Federalist No.
51, Madison's culminating essay on the separation of powers. As noted
above, Madison opens this essay with a call for an "interior" solution to
maintain the separation of powers because all "exterior" solutions have
failed. 216 Although Madison does not define the term "exterior," we
know from earlier essays that parchment barriers and constitutional
conventions fail his standards as "exterior" solutions.Z17 This immediately calls into question the idea that "checking powers" qualify as an
interior solution. Checking powers only work "externally"-they are
imposed from without, by one department against another.
Garry Wills has suggested that some of these textual difficulties might
be resolved if we focused less on checks as a whole and more on a
particular check-the bicameral legislature.218 At least superficially, this
suggestion seems to offer a way to reconcile the checks idea and Madison's
parameters for practical security: bicameralism looks more like an
"interior" solution because it occurs "inside" the legislature, and it looks
less like a parchment barrier because it depends upon the division of
branches based on differing connections and ties. 219 There, however, the
promise of bicameralism as practical security ends. If bicameralism were
sufficient, alone, why would Madison have claimed in No. 47 that in "no
instance" -including the nine states with bicameral legislatures220-had

214. 1 id. at 99 (statement of Be~amin Franklin of Pennsylvania, June 4, 1787).
215. Id.
216. THE FEDERALisr No. 51, at 320.
217. Id. at 320; see THE FEDERALisr No. 49, at 317 ("[M]ere declarations in the written
Constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several departments within their legal rights."); THE
FEDERALisr No. 48, at 308..{)9 ("[E]xperience assures us that the efficacy of [parchment barriers] has
been greatly overrated •••• ").
218. WILLS, supra note 18, at 117.
219. See id. at 122 ("For [Madison] there is only one powerful check in the three powers, and
that is within the legislature. If it restrains itself, tile other two will be safe." (emphasis in original)).
220. See McDONALD, supra note 24, at 86-87 (listing the nine state constitutions that provided
for bicameral legislatures).
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"a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the
separation delineated on paper"?221 Why had Virginia's government
dissolved into legislative despotism if its bicameral legislature were a
"competent provision" to maintain the separation of powers?222
I am not claiming that checking powers, including bicameralism, are
irrelevant to Madison's scheme. Indeed, they are a crucial element of a
system that seeks to prevent the undue dependency of one department upon
another. That checks are necessary, however, does not mean that they are
sufficient to explain or maintain the separation of powers. As we have
seen, checking powers may be made the engine of corruption and collapse
just as easily as the engine of separation. In the end, what distinguishes
the two is not the nature of the checking power itself, but the structure of
incentives that protect those who wield that power.
Modern experience tends to bear out the implications of Madison's
essays-checking powers are important, but inherently limited, tools. A
department does not resist encroachments because it is armed with checking
powers but because the encroachment threatens the department's identity
and prerogatives. When department members perceive a threat to their
institution's power and, by analogy, to their own official identity, they
resist-whether a specific checking power exists or not. 223 This is
precisely the message Madison offers in his Federalist essays: protecting

the personal incentives of those who govern is as important to separation
as is any specific power or legal authority granted. Those incentives exist
(or do not exist) without regard to the specific checking powers the

221. THE FEDERALisrNo. 47, at 308. One might argue that Madison's condemnation of the state
constitutions in No. 47 was simply meant to emphasize his concerns about the inherent aggressiveness
of legislative power. See infra note 231 (documenting Madison's fear of legislative power). But this
interpretation would not necessarily support the conclusion that bicameralism (or, for that matter, any
particular check) would qualify as Madison's "answer" because this argument would justify any
restraint on the legislative power.
.
222. Even if we were to assume that bicameralism were to sit atop the "due foundation" protecting
the departments from internal corruption, it still leaves much to be desired as a eandidate for Madison's
practical security because it does not explain how separation between other departments is achieved and
sustained or explain evidence both inside and outside 7he Federalist that Madison believed the separation between the executive and the legislature (and not between the legislative branches) was most
important to maintain. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 153, at 255, 255-56 ("[I]fthere is a principle
in our constitution ..• more sacred than another, it is that which separates the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers •••• ").
223. Imagine, for example, that the paradigmatic "check" did not exist-the veto power.
Certainly, the president would be weaker, but not powerless. Even without a specified "check," the
executive department is likely to oppose the legislature's actions and may still "defend" its prerogatives.
For example, the president may direct his officers to delay or narrowly interpret a directive; he may
ignore the directive and seek a political rapprochement with the legislature; or he may appeal to the
people. See Kurland, supra note 13, at 606 (noting that the president's "usual weapons" against
challenges to its power by other branches include "appeals to the electorate" and "control of
disbursements and appointments").
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Constitution enumerates, and they will find expression with or without
constitutionally specified means.
B.

Shared Powers: Madison's False Promise

The difficulties of the checks and balances theory have prompted many
to argue that it should be replaced by the idea of "shared powers. " 224
Advocates of this approach tell us that the checks idea trades on a false
metaphor-that the "branches of government [are] not designed to be at
war with one another. " 225 Under this view, the departments do not battle
themselves into submission; they cooperate or negotiate themselves into
equilibrium. Shared powers moderate each department's demands, and, in
this way, control and channel the impulse to encroach. As one observer
has put it, "the sharers of power have to figure out a way to cooperate in
exercising the shared powers or the result is deadlock. " 226
By recognizing that formal definitions do not describe how separation
disputes are regulated on a day-to-day basis, the shared power theory
makes significant gains on the checks theory. These descriptive gains are
not matched, however, by the theory's prescriptive power. Even if shared
powers "theory" more accurately describes the day-to-day business of
government, the theory does not tell us how the most important power
disputes should be resolved or what the structure of government should
look like. If we push the shared power theory, how far are we to go? Is
all sharing permissible? Or only some? It is one thing to argue that
sharing exists, or that negotiation resolves most separation disputes; it is
quite another to say that sharing is wise or something to be encouraged.
To put it more concretely, it is one thing to say that existing arrangements
allow the president to "share" legislative power with Congress through the
veto, but it is quite another to suggest that judges should "share" the
legislative power by voting as members of Congress. Like the checks
theory, the shared powers idea-if pushed-tends to swallow the very
separation ideal that it was intended to implement.
On more than one occasion, Madison's Federalist essays have been
enlisted in the battle for a "shared powers" approach. 227 Although the
224. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Now Is the Tune for All Good Men • •• , 30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
387, 387 (1989) (stating that the Framers compromised between a total separation of powers and the
need for checks and balances by creating separate branches with some shared powers); Edward H.
Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 391 (1976) (lamenting the
adversarial relationships among the branches and urging "[i]nstitutional self-restraint"). It is common
usage to state that we have a government of "shared powers." See, e.g., Verlruil, Rule ofLaw, supra
note 13, at 301 ("The 'celebrated maxim' of separation of powers ••• is not really accurate as a
description of how our government works-the phrase 'shared powers' says it better •••• ").
225. Levi, supra note 224, at 391.
226. Lloyd N. Cutler, Some Reflections About Divided Government, 18 PREsiDENTIAL STUD. Q.
485, 486 (1988).
227. E.g., Bruff, supra note 13, at 493 ("The Federalist Papers provide ample support for the
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text seems to encourage this reliance, 228 the essays as a whole do not
support such a reading. Indeed, to believe that Madison unhesitatingly
embraced any and all "shared powers" produces some rather unlikely
readings of the essays. It would require us to forget that Federalist No. 47
condemns powers improperly blended or mixed. 229 It would require us
to believe that periodic or occasional conventions would be an appropriate
solution as long as we could induce them to recommend shared
powers. 230 And, most importantly, it would require us to believe that
Madison-whose greatest fear was the aggrandizement of legislative
power-was willing to tolerate any initiative on the part of Congress that
would permit it to "share" other departments' powers.231
Perhaps most importantly, the shared powers approach leaves no room
for an essential part of Madison's vision: the idea that separation is as
much the product of personal incentives, structurally protected, as of
authority granted. That the president must negotiate legislation and in this
sense "shares" the legislative power with Congress does not tell us whether
the president will act as rival or as sycophant when Congress decides to use
its power to encroach on the executive's prerogatives.232 From the

proposition that the framers contemplated considerable blending of power."); Farina, supra note 18,
at 494 (arguing that Madison viewed the sharing of power as "not a perversion of the principle of
separation of powers, ••• but rather the means most likely to ensure its fullest expression").
228. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308; see infra text accompanying notes 235-41 (explaining this
text).
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301. This implies, of course, that Madison did approve of a
"proper" level ofblending. AB I argue later, however, this claim amounts to little more than the "flipside" of the checks argument. See infra text accompanying notes 235-41.
230. See THE FEDERALIST No. 50, at 317-20 (rejecting suggestions that conventions could serve
as an effective remedy for infractions of the separation of powers).
231. Madison's fear of legislative power is repeated throughout the essays. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310-12 (giving examples of ststes whose legislatures have encroached on the
other branches); THE FEDERALIST No. 50, at 318 (envisioning a legislature "eagerly bent on some
favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of it"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (explaining that the bicameral system and the veto are necessacy to
check the legislature); see also 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 35 (ststement of James
Madison of Virginia, July 17, 1787) ("Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to throw
all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than
Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent.").
232. The president has often concurred in legislative proposals that are later found to violate the
separation of powers. See, e.g., Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-34 (1986) (striking down the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Act as a violation of the separation of powers); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion) (striking down
Congress's creation of non-Article m bankruptcyjudges as violating the separation of powers); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down the Federal Election Commission
membership provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as violating the separation of
powers). Similarly, presidents often sign legislation while voicing misgivings about its constitutionality.
See, e.g., LoUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, PoUTICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125-26,
130 (1992) (describing a histocy of presidential "misgivings" about the constitutionality of bills
containing legislative vote provisions).
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perspective of one concerned with potential "dependencies" of those who
actually run the departments, it matters not a whit which adjective we
choose: describing our system as one of separated or shared powers will

not sustain departmental independence if the departmental competition we
hzow as the separation ofpowers has no competitors. 233
Madison's text has provided substantial, albeit false, encouragement
for those seeking to mold him as an advocate of "shared powers." At the
very start of No. 48, Madison summarizes his earlier essay, No. 47, as
demonstrating that the maxim of separation "does not require that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly
unconnected with each other. " 234 In No. 48, Madison sheds the tentativeness of this statement: "I shall undertake, in the next place, to show
that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which
the maxim requires . . . can never in practice be duly maintained. " 235
At first glance, these seem strong and clear words in support of a
"shared powers" theory. The initial puzzle here-a substantial one-is how
these statements can survive in essays otherwise rife with applause for
separation and independence. The puzzle becomes even more difficult to
unravel when we find that Madison never follows up on his promise. The
terms "blending" and "connection" announced so loudly in the introduction
to No. 48 disappear altogether from that essay and those that immediately
follow. 236 We proceed through three entire essays without as much as
an ofihand reference to "blending" or "connection." Has Madison's
fondness for turning the tables led him to mislead us?237 Or does he
sense that a broad claim for sharing power might be politically
dangerous?238
If one believes that sharing describes The Federalist's separation of
powers, then No. 48's statement about "connection" and "blending" seems

233. See THE FED.ERAUsr No. 51, at 321-22 (arguing that the competing personal ambitions of
those in different branches will prevent power from becoming concentrated).
234. THE FEo.ERAUsr No. 48, at 308.
235. Id.
236. For example, although Madison typically summarizes his "last number" in each subsequent
essay, his summary of No. 48 includes no mention of "blending" or "connection": "We found in the
last paper that mere declarations in the written Constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several
departments within their legal rights." THB FEo.ERAUsr No. 49, at 317.
237. Madison was fond of reversing the received wisdom. CARBY, supra note 18, at 56 & n.5.
Madison's most famous argument of this type was, of course, his claim that the vast geography of
America was essential to a republican government, an argument that reversed the traditional view that
large republics could not survive. See THE FEo.ERAUsr No. 10, at 82-84 (contending that elections
in large republics will produce better representstives).
238. When Madison made a similar claim at the Constitutional Convention, it was roundly
rejected by his colleagues. See 1 FEDERAL CONVBNTION,supra note 1, at 140, 138-40 (June 6, 1787)
(documenting the rejection ofMadison's idea that the executive and judicial branches should share "in
the revisionary business" of interpreting the laws).
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nothing better than a cruel tease. If we reduce our expectations, however,
and return to the text, Madison's statements in No. 48 can be seen as
proposing something a good deal more limited. Madison's sharing turns
out to be nothing more than the flip side of the checks theory: he claims
that the departments should be "so jar connected and blended" -so far "as
to give to each a constitutional control over the others. "239 This is
sharing incident to control; powers may be shared only to the extent that
they give a department the ability to defend itself.
Madison's point here is a logical one: checking powers may, from a
distance, appear. as shared powers. 240 Much like a figure-ground
drawing, in which a black silhouette appears and then recedes depending
upon how closely one focuses, powers may appear at once as checks and
as connections. Making the intellectual move from one to the other simply
requires a greater focal distance. For example, we may describe Iraq and
the United States as struggling world powers by focusing on each
separately or seriatim. But if we bring them both within our intellectual
viewfinder, we see their battle as a joint engagement in the shared
enterprise of world politics. 741 Similarly, we see the veto power as a
check (if we focus on either the executive department or the legislative),
but if we retreat further afield, we may see the veto as a connection
between departments.
The only remaining reference to "connection" in these essays
reinforces the view that Madison's idea of "sharing" departs from the
contemporary idea of "shared powers" as an exercise in self-moderating
negotiation. In No. 51, Madison briefiy addresses antifederalist claims that
the Constitution improperly blends legislative and executive authority. 742

239. THE FEDERAIJsr No. 48, at 308.
240. This reading is further supported by Madison's usage in No. 47. Attempting to rebut the
antifederalists' complaint that the Constitution failed to achieve sufficient separation, Madison argues
that the state constitutions "blend" at least some powers. One example of blending Madison uses is
the veto power, which he says "connects" the executive and the legislature. THE FEDERAIJsr No. 47,
at 304.
Montesquieu also made clear that the veto power meant a kind of power sharing between the
executive and the legislative departments: "The executive power, pursuant to what has been already
said, ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of refusing, otherwise it would soon be
stripp'd of its prerogatives." MONTESQUIEU, supra note 38, at Book XI, ch. 6[52], at 210. At the
same time, Montesquieu explicitly condemned other kinds of shared power: "If the prince were to have
a share in the legislature by the power of enacting, liberty would be lost." Id. at Book XI, ch. 6[53],
at 210.
241. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 19, at 1119-20 (making a similar analogy to descn"be the
"sharing" anticipated by the Framers).
242. See, e.g., FEDERAIJsrSAND ANTIFEDERAIJsrs,supra note23, at 68 ("The combination of
the Senate and President in appointments and treaty-making was denounced [by the antifederalists] as
a violation of the principle of separation of powers."); JACKSON T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERAIJsrS:
CRlTICS OF THE CoNSflTUTION 138-39 (1961) (noting the antifederalist objections to the combined
power of the Senate and president); 3 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 358 (statement of
HeinOnline -- 74 Tex. L. Rev. 492 1995-1996

1996]

'!he Federalist Papers as Political Narrative

493

He defends this "qualified connection" as necessary so that the "weaker
branch of the stronger department [the Senate] ... may be led to support
the constitutional rights of the [executive], without being too much
detached from the rights of its own department. " 243 This is a claim of
alliance by the weaker departments against the stronger: the Senate comes
to the executive's defense, not to moderate its own power, but to preserve
its power from attack by its rival in the legislature, the House. In the end,
the sharing Madison defends in No. 51 is not one in which joint power
moderates, but one in which power is joined to create shared incentives to
thwart a more dangerous aggressor. 244

C.

Functional Division

Finally, we should consider the claim that "functional" division forms
the core of Madison's separation of powers. It is a widely held view,
common to a variety of theoretical positions, that the three departments
serve different functions and that these functional distinctions are essential
to preserve the separation of powers. Assumed, here, is the idea that
"[t]he executive Power," the "legislative Powers," and "[t]he judicial
Power" 245 represent different kinds of power readily distinguishable in
theory, if not in practice. 246 Although typically associated with those
who favor a weak separation of powers rule, this idea of "functional"
separation is implicit in positions ranging from the left to the right, from
originalists to realists,247 and from formalists to critical pragmatists. 248

Abraham Baldwin, June 19, 1789, Ftrst Congress) ("[T]he mingling of the powers of the President
and Senate was strongly opposed in the convention • • • • One gentleman called it a monstrous and
unnatural connexion, and did not hestitate to affirm it would bring on convulsions in the
Government."); see also Letter from James Madison to Wilson C. Nicholas (July 18, 1789), in 12
PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 153, at 294 ("[T]he degree of mixture established by the
Const[itution] ••• has been a ground of one of the strongest objections agst. it.").
243. THE FEDERAUsr No. 51, at 323 (emphasis added).
244. See James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 17, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 153, at 232, 234 ("[I]f in any case they [the departments] are blended, it is in
order to admit a partial qualification ••• to guard against an entire consolidation.").
245. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 1; art. ill, § 2, cl. 1.
246. The idea that functional description sits at the core of the "original" separation of powers
comes from the work of Professor Vile, who argues that the "pure" view of separation required pure
functional designations. MJ.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 13-18,
153-71 (1967). As J.G.A. Pocock notes, Vile's thesis here is "slightly ahistorical." Pocock, supra
note 24, at 479-80, 480 n.52 (arguing that the language of function and corruption were intertwined
and that, ultimately, the idea of corruption won out).
247. Compare Carter, Improprieties, supra note 13, at364-76 (adopting a quasi-originalistposition
but tacitly adopting a "functional" description of the separation of powers) with Paul Gewirtz, Realism
in Separation ofPowers Thinking, 30 WM. &MARY L. REV. 343, 348-51 (adopting a "realist" position
that also appears to assume "functional" division).
248. Compare Redish & Cisar, supra note 13, at 474-90 (adopting a formalist position that tacitly
assumes a "functional" division) with Tushnet, supra note 13, at 597-603 (adopting a critical stance
that tacitly assumes a "functional" division).
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When I use the term "functional," I am describing a phenomenon far
more general than the term "functionalism" denotes.
So-called
functionalism is shorthand for a decision rule in separation of powers cases
that generally defers to Congress's judgments about political structure. 249
The argument I address here has less to do with how courts should dedde
separation of powers cases (something to which I tum in Part V) than how
we should conceive or think of the separation of powers. The premise that
the separation of powers amounts to a separation of functions is not limited
to those who favor a functionalist decision rule; it is widely shared by
those who take precisely the opposite position on the proper approach
toward deciding separation of powers cases. 250
Despite its widespread appeal in the modem era, little in The
Federalist text signals a theory centered on functional definition. No. 51,
the culminating essay, offers almost no support for the popular assumption
that a separation of functions is crucial to Madison's vision. 251
References to lawmaking and law implementation, to adjudication and to
execution, are conspicuously absent from this essay. Madison discusses the
"exercise of the different powers of government," "the appointments for
the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies," and
"distinct and separate departments. " 252 He speaks of the "interests" of
men, the "will" of departments, and the "necessary constitutional means,
and personal motives, to resist encroachments . . . . " 253 He speaks of
structure and foundation and of institutional rivalry, 254 but he never
promises that functional divisions shall secure the separation of
powers. 255
Elsewhere in the essays, however, Madison does make significant
references to functional categories. He tells us, for example, in No. 48
that powers "may in their nature be legislative, executive, or
judiciary. " 256 And, in No. 47, Madison refers to powers that are

249. On functionalism generally, see Strauss, supra note 9, at 510-26 (advocating a functionalist
decision rule in separation-of-powers cases) and Brown, supra note 8, at 1522-31 (contrasting a formalist decision rule with a functionalist decision rule).
250. See Redislt & Cisar, supra note 13, at 474-90 (adopting a position of "pragmatic formalism"
that assumes functional distinctions).
251. This lias been noted, but left unexplored, by other readers of the text. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
supra note 18, at 127.
252. THEFEDERAUSTNo. 51, at321, 323.
253. /d. at 322, 321, 321-22.
254. /d. at 320-23.
255. At one point, when discussing the Senate's role in the new government, Madison descdbes
the "brancltes" of government as having "common functions," presumably referdng to the legislative
function of the House and Senate. /d. at 322. The term "function" appears nowhere else in No. 51.
256. THE FEDERAUST No. 48, at 308. Such references appear elsewhere in Madison's wdtings.
See, e.g., Madison, supra note 244, at 237 ("I conceive that the president is sufficiently accountable
to the community; and if this power is vested in him, it will be vested where its nature requires it
should be vested •••• ").
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inherently "executive," such as the appointment and pardon powers.257
But, in each case, Madison tells us that these asswnptions do nothing to
secure the Constitution from political collapse: "Discriminating [the
powers] in theory" is not the most difficult task-that task "is to provide
some practical security for each [department] against the invasion of the
others."258 Clearly, Madison believed that powers could be classifie.d
along functional lines, that certain powers were "in their nature" executive,
judicial, or legislative.259 It would be wrong then to claim that functional
description was irrelevant to his argument. At the same time, however,
Madison was profoundly skeptical about our capacity to divine or delineate
functional boundaries with precision. In No. 37, he explains that "no skill
in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define,
with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative,
executive, and judiciary. " 260 Even the "greatest adepts in political
science" were unable to unravel this puzzle.261
This skepticism about the efficacy of formal categories ultimately leads
Madison to reject classification as a proper means to protect the separation
of powers. Indeed, No. 48 may be read as a long rebuttal to those who
argue that precise definitional boundaries are the key to maintaining
separate departments. Boundaried solutions, Madison tells us, have been
tried and have failed. 262 Despite its strict constitutional classification of
functions, the Virginia legislature had, in fact, asserted improper powers,
powers that belonged to other departments.263 Thus, although Madison
assumed quite readily the possibility of categorization and even argued for
the importance of particular designations as "executive," "legislative," or
"judicial, " 264 he held out little hope that the categories might fend off
power-holders bent upon subverting them. Indeed, this position is inherent
in the very project Madison sets for himself in Federalist No. 51: one only
asks "to what expedient . . . shall we finally resort, for maintaining in
practice the necessary partition of power" if the partition itself is
inadequate to secure the separation of powers.265

257. See THBFEDERAUsrNo. 47, at 306-07 (describing powers granted in the state constitutions).
258. Tim FEDERAUsr No. 48, at 308.
259. See, e.g., Tim FEDERAUsr No. 48, at 308. Indeed, he seems to have recognized that the
Constitution itself mingles functions. See Madison, supra note 153, at 255-56 (recognizing that the
Senate is granted an "executive" function in its ability to advise and consent to the appointment of
executive officers).
260. THBFEDERAUsrNo. 37, at228.
261. Id.
262. THBFEDERAUsrNo. 48, at ~10-13.
263. Id. at 310-11.
264. THBFEDERAUsrNo. 37, at228.
265. Tim FEDERAUsr No. 51, at 320; see supra subpart ll(D).
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If we take a closer look at what Madison did see as practical
security-his theory of allegiance-we can begin to understand just how
little functional division appears to matter. Imagine a government in which
powers are distributed without regard to the familiar tripartite division.
Department A wields the power to judge but also carries out legislative and
executive tasks. Department B wields the power to legislate but also
performs adjudicative and executive tasks. Department C wields the power
to execute but also legislates and adjudicates. (This is not very far, of
course, from a description of our present government.) Now imagine that
these departments each have separate memberships and that the members'
allegiance to their departments is secured by a combination of appointment,
removal, and tenure provisions ensuring their relative independence from
interbranch manipulation. Under Madison's theory, these departments will
remain just as secure and separate as if each performed along completely
different functional lines. 266 If separation depends upon a division of
departments with independent personnel, then what the departments are
doing becomes far less important than who does it. In the example above,
Department B will refuse to allow Department A to steal its powers, not
because ofDepartmentB's functional description, but because the members
of Department B will fight to retain their institution's identity.
If allegiance to place propels separation in a world of rival
departmental loyalties, then functional designation takes on a secondary,
supporting, role. Rather than an end in itself, it becomes a means of
ensuring allegiance. Imagine a case, for example, in which one department
usurped the powers of another department and this usurpation was so great
that it effectively gutted the first department's most important functions.
Whether or not a particular functional distribution has been violated, if
those in the raided department no longer have a separate institutional
mission to support their allegiance, the separation of powers is threatened.
Allegiance to place requires not only allegiance, but also a place.
Could this be right? Could separation be sustained under a wide
variety of functional distributions? At one level, given Madison's belief
that we are incapable of defining departmental boundaries with
certainty, 267 this functional neutrality should not seem surprising. At
another level, however, the apparent "emptiness" of Madison's proposed
solution will give more than a few readers pause. It should not, however,

266. The same exercise may be performed with three educational institutions. Take, for example,
the University of Wisconsin, the University of Texas, and the University of Michigan. All of these
institutions have the same "functional" description. These universities "do" similar things and yet they
retain separate institutional identities and traditions. These institutional identities would soon begin to
bleed into each other, however, if members of the faculty of one institution (Texas) had the power to
appoint or remove members of another (Wisconsin or Michigan).
267. THBFEDERAUSTNo. 37, at228.
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be misinterpreted as a claim that functions may be jumbled at will. That
a governmental structure radically different than our own might still
maintain "separation" does not mean that the resulting structure would be
wise or constitutional. Shifts in power may violate individual rights,268
other constitutional requirements (bicameralism, for example),269 or more
basic principles of republican government. ?:10 For example, any system
that accorded greater powers to the legislature would, for Madison, have
posed serious dangers;271 similarly, any system that permitted strong
political influences in individual litigation would have posed an equally
serious question. m One need not advocate the scrambling of functions
to maintain that we must try to distinguish between functional description
as necessary to separation and its utility elsewhere in constitutional
law. 273 As I argue below, functional description "stands in" for norms
that are crucial to the political relationships created by our constitutional
structure.274 That functional norms may be important for a whole host
of reasons, however, does not mean that they describe Madison's practical
security or that they maintain the separation of powers.
IV. Beyond the Canon-Toward a Different Narrative of Power
Looking at the separation of powers through the lenses of checks,
shared powers, and functional division has shaped our idea of the "power"
we seek to separate. Each of these approaches assumes a narrative in
which "the powers" are synonymous with law and legal authority: departments enjoy the power to do that which they have the legal authority to
do. 215 This idea of power is largely disembodied and apolitical. It has

268. See Brown, supra note 8, at 1514, 1534 (arguing that structure is essential to the protection
of individual rights).
269. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (holding
that a one-house legislative veto violates constitutional bicameralism requirements).
270. See infra text accompanying notes 390-91 (arguing that departmental "independence" may
raise questions of accountability and, hence, of republicanism).
271. See supra note 231 (detailing Madison's fears oflegislative power).
272. See, e.g.,IamesMadison, TreasuryDepartment(Iune29, 1789),in 12PAPERSOFMADISON,
supra note 153, at 265, 265, 265-66 (noting that the comptroller of the Treasury Department, although
an executive official, has duties that "partake of a judiciary quality" and thus should be insulated from
political influences); THE FEoERAUST No. 48, at 311 (quoting Jefferson's lament that the legislature
had decided "rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy" (emphasis in original)
(quoting ]EFFERSON, supra note 17, at 120)).
273. This might well have been understood at the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., 2
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 78 (statement of I ames Wilson of Pennsylvania, Iuly 21,
1787) ("The separation of the departments does not require that they should have separate objects but
that they should act separately tho' on the same objects. It is necessary that the two branches of the
Legislature should be separate and distinct, yet they are both to act precisely on the same object.").
274. See infra text accompanying notes 308-13.
275. Compare Carter, Improprieties, supra note 13, at 364, 368, 364-76 (arguing for a "deevolutionary" or originalist approach and assuming that "the powers" are synonymous with legal or
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no apparent relationship to the people who wield it; it exists independent
of human agency. Power is simultaneously an institutional attribute and a
definition. When we speak of "the" executive power, "the" legislative
power, and "the" judicial power, we seek to describe and delineate, to
define and thus possess, an "object" we imagine to correspond to
"power. " 276 When we bring this project to our readings of 'Jhe
Federalist, we simply engraft its limitations onto another text and thus
perpetuate the very contradictions from which we seek to free ourselves.
This idea of power makes silent demands on us. It requires that we
find the object we have identified277 and that we name it, rather than
focus on those who hold it. And, because we need to know the nature of
the power identified, we become easily drawn into a search for power's
attributes. Soon, the most important questions about the separation of
powers appear to tum on the adjectives that describe legal power: whether
we call something legislative, judicial, or executive becomes crucial to the
analysis. 278 This focus on attributes, in tum, carries with it an implicit,
albeit unexpressed, demand for uniformity. When we see power as a
substance, we see it as a "substance[] of a uniform kind. " 279 This
uniformity demands of the object that it have hard edges-that the
legislative power be "all-legislative" or the executive power, "allexecutive. " 280 Once attributes are important, their implicit claim to
homogeneity becomes an invitation for disappointment-for power sought
that cannot be described. 281

functional authority) with Strauss, supra note 9, at 492, 495-96 (adopting a "functionalist" position and
assuming that "the powers" are synonymous with legal or functional authority).
276. See Elliott, supra note 13, at 527 ("Long ago Justice Holmes pointed out that legal concepts
like 'executive, judicial, and legislative' are not 'things' that 'have' immutable existences; rather, they
are constructs that we create to serve purposes, and these purposes should define their reach and
measure.").
277. See Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 993, 999 (1994) (describing the inevitable tendency in teaching structural issues to locate and
visualize structure in terms of "concrete objects" or "building blocks").
278. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (characterizing the comptroller
general's responsibilities as "executive") with id. at 744-45 (Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing
the comptroller general's responsibilities as both "executive" and "legislative").
279. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 25 (1980) ("Understanding
our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and
treat them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind.").
280. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33 (rejecting efforts of concurring and dissenting
Justices to recharacterize the comptroller general's functions as anything but exclusively "executive"
in nature).
281. The tendency to overlook the relational aspects inherent in concepts may hold true at a more
general level. Martha Minow has argued, for example, that all categories tacitly reflect relationships
between that which is included and excluded, that which is the same and that which is different.
MARTHA MIN OW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW22728 (1990).
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We have abstracted the idea of power from its actual exercise and, as
a result, we have thought about the separation of powers in the wrong
way.m We have subtracted those who hold power from our idea of
what power is.283 In the process, we have substituted a formal idea of
power for a political and human idea of power. The Federalist essays
suggest, by contrast, that power is not only a question of legal authority,
but also a matter of personal connection and incentive.284 Perched on the
edge of modernity, Madison acknowledges power in the more modem
sense of legal authority,285 but he also embraces an idea of power that
bears the stamp of an earlier day, one in which the force of social and class
ties was far more powerful than any grant of legal authority.286
The essays themselves are the best evidence of the distance our idea
of a formal, legalized ideal of power must travel to meet Madison's.
Consider, for example, his argument that the legislative power was indeed
the weightiest:
The members of the legislative department . . . are distributed and
dwell among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of
friendships and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the
most influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust
implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are
more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and
liberties of the people. 287
Madison's fear of legislative power depended not only upon the authority
granted to Congress in the constitutional document, but also upon the
granting of that power to members with the closest personal ties and

282. On the dangers of abstraction in this field, see Verkuil, Rule ofLaw, supra note 13, at 301,
301-03 ("The 'celebrated maxim' of separation of powers frustrates analysis because of its abstract
dimensions." (quoting THE FEDERALisr No. 47, at 303)).
283. An importsnt exception to this assumption appeara in the work of those writing from an
economic perspective who rightly recognize the importsnce of institutions' different political audiences.
See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 162, at 216-30.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 150-57, 168-76.
285. See THE FEDERALisr No. 47, at 301-03 (using the term power, in some cases, to signify
authority).
286. See PocOCK, supra note 24, at 481 (noting the transformation of feudal ideas of homage and
tenure into ideas that depended upon the "connection" offered by such arrangements as the
"placemen").
287. THE FEDERALisrNo. 49, at 316. Focus on the idea of "faction" presented in FEDERALisr
No. 10 has led some scholars to emphasize Madison's concern with minoritarian bias. See, e.g.,
IonathanR. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Nonnative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An
.Application to Constitutional'Iheory, 14 VA. L. REv. 471, 483-84 (1988) (claiming that Madison's
concern about factions arose from the nullification of contracts by stste legislatures in an attempt to
benefit special interest groups); see also KOMESAR, supra note 162, at 217 (discussing "recent attempts
to analyze the Constitution in one-force (minoritarian bias) terms"). The Framers feared majoritarian
bias as much as, if not more than, minoritarian bias. Id. at 218.
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influence among the people. 288 This is a political, rather than a formal,
image of power. Power is not only authority; it is also connection,
allegiance, acquaintance. (What is more "political" than a standard that
depends upon who one "knows"?) Structure, in Madison's view, does not
create power; indeed, law does not create power.289 Both of these things
channel power. Power exists before law and structure290 because it
depends upon human "connection"-the familial, governmental, commercial, and political ties between people. 291 Madison did not look for
power as an object in the world and make a judgment about it in the
abstract; nor did he assume that power always leads to corrupt motives.
As Neil Komesar has argued, Madison had a far more "sophisticated
perception of the systemic nature of political malfunction, m 92 and he
knew the role that political participation played in forming and
transforming institutions.
When Madison emptied mixed-government theory's tripartite division
of social classes and replaced it with three departments, 293 he transformed
the idea of "power" based on social relationship to one based on constitutional and political relationship. Electoral allegiances built upon
different connections to the people illled the blank spaces in which social
classes once fit. Each department thus represents a different expression of
electoral relationship and responsibility, of political audience and
connection. 294 The executive department, for example, "is responsible to
the whole community, " 295 while the Senate (as originally elected) is
"responsible to individual legislatures. " 296 The House exercises power

288. THE FEDERAUsrNo. 49, at 316-17; see KOMESAR, supra note 162, at 219 (arguing that "the
major Federalist response to • • • majoritarian excess . • . " was to insulate "federal government
decision-makers from local majorities").
289. Madison notes several incidents in which "legal barriers" to power had been ineffectual. See,
e.g., THB FEDERAUsr No. 48, at 310-11 (recounting that legislative tyranny developed in Virginia
despite an express constitutional provision enjoining separation); THB FBDERAUsr No. 50, at 318
(recalling that the Pennsylvania legislature ignored constitutional pronouncements on the separation of
powers).
290. See, e.g., THB FEDERAUsr No. 49, at 317, 316-17 (arguing that "the spirit of pre-existing
parties" will distort the decisions of constitutional conventions); THB FEDERAUsr No. 50, at 320
(maintaining the inevitability of parties and faction). See generally THB FBDERAUsr No. 10, at 77-84
(describing the power and "violence of faction").
291. See THE FEDERAUsr No. 49, at 316 (arguing that the executive and judiciary departments
are less powerful because they will only be "personally known to a small part ••• of the people" and
because the judiciary "are too far removed from the people"); id. at 317 (arguing that public decisions
will be distorted because of their effect upon "persons of ••• extensive influence in the community").
292. KOMESAR, supra note 162, at 219 n.46.
293. See WOOD, supra note24, at 152; text accompanying note 193.
294. See KOMESAR, supra note 162, at 202 (discussing the different electoral relationships that
empower the branches).
295. Madison, supra note 244, at 237.
296. Id.
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"inspired by a supposed influence over the people. " 297 Both Congress
and the president obtain their power from the electorate in ways barred to
the judiciary, whose members are immunized from politics by life
tenure. 298 In this sense, it is perhaps better to call Madison's separation
a separation of political power rather than a separation of legal or
functional powers.
If this understanding is correct, it is not surprising that Madison
spends less time in his Federalist essays fretting about the definition of
powers or functions than he does grappling with the dangers that
"connections" between persons pose for the constitutional design. 299 For
Madison, the question raised in separation of powers cases is not only what
power has been grabbed or what kind of power it is, but also what kind of
connections will govern its deployment. Because experience had shown
that serious dangers lay in personal connections, Madison's solutions
depend upon crafting structural incentives for personal independence. To
prevent the corruption of members of one department by those of another,
Madison advocated a "due foundation" for the separation of powers that
depends upon making "members of each department . . . as little dependent
as possible on those of the others . . . . " 300
We have been unable to see this strain of Madison's thought because
we bring to his essays assumptions that make it impossible to see. Today,
when we read The Federalist, we bring to the text our search for something
called "power." This leads us to look for the attributes of powerseparation, sharing, and function. We find ourselves trying to cabin
Madison within the ambit of one or more of these descriptions, but, soon,
we find ourselves mired in apparent contradiction. Madison says separation here, and sharing there; distinctness here, and connection there.
We are left in a muddle from which our assumptions provide no apparent
release. If, however, we jettison the search for an attribute or description
and begin to see the idea of power as both a question of law and politics,

297. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at309.
298. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (noting that the judiciary has no electoral allegiance
because judges enjoy life tenure).
299. In this, Madison was certainly not alone. Proponents and opponents of the Constitution were
equally focused on the "connections" and the political "dependence" of those who would hold power
under the new government. The records of the Constitutional Convention, for example, are replete
with references emphasizing the importance of the "hands" in which power was held. Indeed, much
of the Convention was devoted to deciding questions of institutional design, such as who would appoint
judges, who would elect the president and the Senate, and how their tenure would be determined. See
1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 128-29 (June 5, 1787) (summarizing various delegates'
views on how judges should be selected); 1 id. at 458-59 (June 27, 1787) (recording the debate on
whether representation should be by "States" or "Numbers"); 1 id. at 474-75 (June 29, 1787)
(recounting the debate over institutional design); see also supra notes 156-57 (discussing concerns about
dependence raised during the ratification debates).
300. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321.
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of what is held and who holds it, at least some of this confusion
disappears. Soon, we are able to understand passages in The Federalist
that we have always ignored. We begin to see that Madison's "due
foundation" 301 is not something to be skipped over, but something that
provides important groundwork for the separation of powers. We begin
to understand why Madison spends so much time in No. 47 describing the
state constitutions in terms that seem so foreign-terms of appointment,
payment, and removal. 302 And, finally, we begin to see why seemingly
strong "exterior" solutions-constitutional prohibitions and conventionstum out to be such flimsy ramparts should one department seek to control
or corrupt the members of another. 303
Consider the common lament that we have a system of government in
which powers are both separate and shared, independent and interdependent. At least on the surface, this suggests contradiction. Indeed,
the contradiction has appeared so great that it has caused some to wonder
whether we should simply jettison the ideal of separation altogether. The
key here is understanding the assumption about power upon which this
dilemma is based. We only speak contradiction when we embrace a
discourse of separated, but shared, powers if we think that what we are
separating or sharing is the same undifferentiated entity called "power."
We only believe that we must choose between a system of separated rather
than shared or checked powers if we believe that what is being separated
and what is being shared or checked is the same thing called "power." We
only believe that we must describe otherwise conflicting views as
"flexible"304 if we believe that what is being shared and separated leads
to conflict because we are sharing and separating the same thing.
If we focus less on the attributes (separation and sharing) of an entity
called "power" and more on power's administrators, these apparent
contradictions, and their fallout, tend to recede in importance. Assume,
for a moment, that the separation of powers depends upon the independence of persons who maintain separate institutional allegiances. Separate
and independent persons wielding shared or checking powers poses no
serious contradiction. And because this assumption identifies separation as
something outside of sharing or cheeking powers, it helps to reduce the
pressure pushing us toward contradiction: if separation depends upon
something different in kind from sharing or checking, then we need not
give up on separation to embrace checking and sharing. We need not

301. Id.
302. THEFEDERAUsrNo. 47, at303-07.
303. E.g., THE FEDERAUsr No. 48, at 308-09; THE FEDERAUsr No. 49, at 313-16; THE
FEDERAUsr No. SO, at 317-18.
304. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (using the term "flexible" to
describe a system of separated and shared powers).
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jettison separation, nor embrace contradiction. We need only reconsider
a very basic assumption about power.
This same reasoning applies, as well, to the current enthusiasm for
functional descriptions of our governmental structure. Just as the idea of
separate powers has led to disillusionment, so too has the idea of separate
functions. It is now widely accepted, for example, that the departments
each perform functions typically associated with other departments. 305
This tension between ideal and reality has prompted despair, desperation,
and dramatic proposals for a revision of our governmental structure.306
These reactions, however, depend upon the perception of a dilemma similar
to the one seen above-a dilemma that may in the end be irrelevant to the
construction of a viable separation of political power. If we see
contradiction when executive agencies purport to exercise nonexecutive
functions, it is because we assume the separation of powers separates
something called a "function." If, as I have tried to show above, 307
separation may be maintained under a variety of functional distributions,
then our concern for functional overlap may be misplaced. At the very
least, we must do more than invoke a picture of failed descriptive purity
to convince ourselves that alterations in functional distribution violate the
separation of powers.
I believe that most contemporary confusions about the separation of
pc;>wers-linguistic, theoretical, and doctrinal-depend in one way or
another upon shared assumptions about the nature of "functional" division.
Functional descriptions have become convenient, albeit misleading,
shorthand for a complex set of political norms and relationships.308 The
Constitution endows each department with a separate electoral pedigree and
audience. 309 It also endows each department with a different "principle
of action" vis-a-vis individuals. 310 The executive department holds the
305. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 511 ("[T]he government we have built and now live with has
attained a complexity and intennarriage of function that beggars the rationalistic tripartite schemes of
the eighteenth century.").
306. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 13, at 1165-66 (suggesting that many of our present
independent agencies are unconstitutional because the president must have political control over
members of the executive branch); Geoffrey P. Miller, JndependentAgendes, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 41,
96-97 (arguing that "the independent agency is ••• an anomalous institution created without regard to
the basic principle of separation of powers").
307. See supra text accompanying notes 245-74.
308. It takes a poet to say the obvious about "functional" description: "When we speak of the
'function' of anything, we are likely to be thinking of what that thing ought to do rather than what it
does do or has done." T.S. EUOT, 71Je Social Function ofPoetry, in ON POETRY AND POETS 15, 15
(1957).
309. "Underlying [the Constitution's institutional] divisions of responsibility are significant
variations in the rules of election, assuring that the various parts of the political process are elected by
different constituencies, by different methods, and for different terms." KoMESAR, supra note 162,
at 202 & n.ll.
310. See THE FEDERALisr No. 51, at 322 (discussing the different "principles of action" of the
two branches of the legislature).
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key to the most immediate impact on citizens: force. It may call out the
army in national emergencies, send the tax collector, or sell our goods at
auction. 311 The judiciary may do none of these things without the aid of
the executive department-it may act upon individuals only by issuing
judgments in "cases or controversies. " 312 The legislative department,
which speaks only in general pronouncements, must be content with even
less of a direct impact on individuals. This structure of incomplete
constitutional power places the departments with the strongest political
connections to the People the farthest away from the use of force against
any particular individual.
When we use the term "function" today, we express these relationships in bureaucratic shorthand. When we say, for example, that we do
not want Congress to execute laws, we appeal to a norm of action based
on a particular political relationship. For example, the member from the
Twenty-first District in Texas, representing only a part of the nation and
subject to its electoral whims, should not be empowered to send the sheriff
to our doors. The difficulty comes when we try to capture this paradigm
of action in the abstraction of functional categories. Once we move from
the claim that the member from the Twenty-first District should not be able
to send the sheriff to our doors to the claim that Congress should not
execute the laws, we face difficult questions about the nature of the term
"execution." We ask ourselves whether Congress does in fact perform
executive functions when it grants power to the Architect of the Capitol,
the Librarian of Congress, or the comptroller general.313 In the process,
we transform the inquiry from one of norm and relationship to one of fact
and description. The question is no longer what kind of political
relationship is at issue or what principle of action governs, but how to
describe "execution." In the process, we not only lose our way; we also
forget that what we came to decide depends, at least in part, upon those
who hold the power in their hands.
My point here is not that we need to jettison "functional" description,
but that we need to reconsider the purposes "functional" description serves.
I have argued, above, that functional description is neither necessary nor

311. For example, Neil Komesar writes:
The single greatest threat to the rules and indeed to the game comes from the monopoly
of force that characterizes government. The military and the police are central
functionaries in any constitutional government. But they are also its major threats. Rule
by the military and the secret police often turns constitutions into empty documents.
KOMESAR, supra note 162, at 202.
312. U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2, cl. I.
313. See, e.g., Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,753 (1986) (Stevens,J., concurring) (addressing
the question whether the comptroller general is an executive officer and noting that the Architect of the
Capitol and the Librarian of Congress "perform functions that could be characterized as 'executive' in
most contexts").
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sufficient to secure separate institutional identities. Although I venture no
complete explanation of the role of "functional" description here, I am
convinced that, as far as the separation of powers is concerned, we have
become victims of our own assumptions. If we continue to believe that
functions, like powers, constitute objects in the world to be described, we
will never get beyond the cancelling quotations; the cancellation is inherent
in the label we use and the implicit uniformity it imposes on our search.
In the end, my rereading of The Federalist challenges us to ask
different questions about the separation of powers than we have asked
before. If we are willing to put to one side the idea of power as an object
to be found or a function to be described and to consider power as conduct,
as acts of will, as incentives, the separation of powers becomes less a
theory about the distribution of legal authority than a theory of institutional
design, less an idea about the definition of function than an idea about the
conduct of political relationships. Read this way, Madison's essays help
us less to find an original version of the separation of powers than to break
our modem frame of reference. 314 They ask us to consider our use of
power as an abstraction and invite us to examine the human element in
power's administration. As I argue in Part V, this transformation offers
preli:m.iuary lessons for some of the more persistent academic and judicial
debates about the separation of powers.
V.

Contemporary Theory and the Madisonian "Foundation"

Long ago, the academic community accepted the proposition that,
when it comes to the separation of powers, we have been left with an
"incoherent muddle. " 315 We have "adopted no theory, embraced no
doctrine, endorsed no philosophy" of the separation of powers that has
convinced any more than a few at a time. 316 It would be convenient,
then, to leave readers to reach their own conclusions about the
contemporary implications of my rereading. But "[t]o merely observe that
the field is chaotic, arcane, or incoherent is to decline the work of
understanding. " 317 In that spirit, this Part explores some of the
implications of my rereading for several persistent separation of powers
controversies.

A.

Lessons for Originalists: Read On

During the past decade, scholars and jurists who repose great
confidence in the power of original intent to guide us toward answers to

314. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 1495 (arguing that taking _the founding ideals of
republicanism seriously may entail rejecting the received wisdom).
315. Brown, supra note 8, at 1517.
316. Id. at 1518.
317. Althouse su ra note 277 at 1001.
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modem constitutional questions have worked to revive an "originalist"
account of the separation of powers. 318 Although positions vary a good
deal, scholars embracing an "originalist" position generally agree upon
some common principles. For example, the originalist typically argues that
we have forsaken the idea of three "distinct" powers and, in the process,
betrayed the Framers' intent.319 To the originalist, there is nothing more
important than "gaining an understanding of the way that those who wrote
and ratified the Constitution hoped that the government structure would
operate. " 320 That understanding is inextricably bound up with legitimacy: a government that strays from the separation ideal, that seeks to
evolve its organization to meet changing governmental need, is a
government whose constitutional "existence" is in doubt. 321 As Stephen
Carter has argued, "The entire point of a constitution that governs structure
is to enable the government to function while restraining the ability of
government to restructure itself. " 322
In an academic and political world largely hostile to the separation
ideal, originalists have expended substantial resources to revive a secure
tripartite division. Urifortunately, the most persuasive originalists or quasioriginalists have argued far more strenuously for an originalist approach
than they have argued about the content of that approach. 323 Originalists
routinely cite Madison as a disciplinarian of the separation of powers who
cautioned us about the importance of maintaining departmental
integrity. 324 Unfortunately, as many have noted, this is a fairly crude
image of Madison's views on the separation of powers.325 Madison
repeatedly rejected the role of departmental drill sergeant. His profound
pessimism that "no skill in the science of government ha[d] yet been able

318. Strains of originalism appear in their most sophisticated and persuasive form in the work of
Steplten Carter, who nevertheless rejects the label of originalism because of its cruder implications.
See Carter, Improprieties, supra note 13, at 368 n.37, 368-76 (refusing the label of "originalist," but
empltasizingthe significance of the intent of the Founders). Other arguments that rely, at least in part,
on originalist ideas may be found in Greene, supra note 13, at 153-77 (basing a claim for newly
devised cltecks on an originalist argument); Merrill, supra note 13, at 255-59 (acknowledging the
importance of constitutional text and structure); and Miller, supra note 306, at 52-58 (advocating a
neoclassical approaclt).
319. Of course, not all those interested in original intent take this position. See, e.g., Farina,
supra note 18, at 496-97 (arguing that the Framers envisioned a flexible sclteme of sltared powers).
320. Carter, Separation of Powers, supra note 13, at 740.
321. Id.
322. Carter, Improprieties, supra note 13, at 366; id. at 375 ("If the courts allow governmental
arrangements that run sharply contrary to the original design, they are in effect drawing upon an
allegiance of the people gained by implying an institutional continuity that does not exist.").
323. See, e.g., id. at 368-76.
324. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Madison as a proponent of strict separationism).
325. See, e.g., CAREY, supra note 18, at 51-56; WillS, supra note 18, at 108-16 (both discussing
the complexity of Madison's views on the separation of powers).
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to discriminate and define . . . the legislative, executive, and judiciary"
was matched only by his conviction that departmental boundaries were no
real "barrier" to departmental encroachment. 326
Originalists will point to contrary indications, such as Madison's
repeated references to the "separate and distinct" exercise of powers and
his praise for the "separation" of powers.327 But these statements simply
beg the question on the strength of an adjective: that 'Jhe Federalist
advocates a separation of powers does not tell us what powers should be
separated, or as the essays put it, "the sense in which" they should be
separate.328 Madison himself tells us this when he implicitly chides the
antifederalists for assuming that "separateness" and "distinctness" are selfevident, uncontroversial concepts.329
It is ironic, but true, that in their effort to find a disciplinarian
Madison, originalists have routinely ignored the very text they revere.
Nowhere in Nos. 47 through 51 does Madison use the precise term
"separate and distinct power." When Madison discusses separateness and
distinctness, he does so repeatedly by making reference to the "hands" in
which power is held,330 to the separate departments or offices of

326. THE FEDERAUST No. 37, at 228; THE FEDERAUST No. 48, at 308-09.
327. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, 7he Founders' Vzews-According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEx. L.
REv. 1033, 1081 (1989) (relying on Madison's praise for the separation of powers).
328. It was the purpose of No. 47 "to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty
requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct." THE FEDERAUST
No. 47, at 301 (emphasis added).
329. See id. (arguing that it is not sufficient to invoke the general concept of separation). Even
those originalists who recognize that Madison's allegiance to "separation" is complex still rely on The
Federalist to support "disciplinarian" outcomes. See, e.g., Steven Calabresi, Some Normative
Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 45-46 (1995) (arguing that 7he Federalist
essays "necessarily" lead "to the idea of a 'unitary executive'"). Calabresi's reading of the essays is,
in my view, inconsistent with the text. Madison did not propose a unitary executive to check legislative
power; he proposed quite the opposite-a "qualified connection" between the president and the Senate
("the weaker branch of the stronger department," THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 323). Madison is referring here to the powers (e.g., the advice and consent power) that link the president to the Congress.
He is not arguing that the executive needs exclusive control over its employees, but that its "joint"
control, with the Senate, restrains the legislative zeal of the House. See id. ("May not this defect of
an absolute negative [the veto] be supplied by 'some qualified connection' between this weaker
department [the executive] and the [Senate], by which the [Senate] may be led to support the constitutional rights of [the president]."). The idea is that, if the House attempts to undermine the powers
shared by the president and the Senate, the Senate will, to preserve its own interest in the process, take
the president's side. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44. Madison is forced into this strained
position by the antifederalists' persistent attacks against the Constitution's connections between the
Senate and the executive. See supra notes 156-57, 242.
330. See THE FEDERAUSTNo. 47, at 301 ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); id. at 302 ("There
can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body
•••• " (quoting Montesquieu)); THE FEDERAUST No. 48, at 310-11 ("All the powers of government,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same
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power, 331 or the separate "administration" and "exercise" of powers.332
These terms are far more consistent with a reading that stresses the
importance of those who hold power than they are with a vision of the
separation of "powers" conceived as legal power or authority alone.
Obviously, it would be folly to rest any argument about 1he Federalist
upon this precise terminology, but it is certainly worthy of more attention
from those who claim to place substantial reliance upon the Founders'
texts.
This is but one example of the way in which some originalists have
assumed the question that I have sought to ask throughout this Article:
what is it that the separation of powers separates? To originalists (and
formalists of all stripes), the answer to this question is self-evident. The
separation of powers separates constitutional authority-the legal
prescriptions provided in the constitutional document. The constitutional
text is not as confident: the text creates both a set of legal authorities
(kinds of things that departments may doY33 and a political structure that

hands is precisely the definition of despotic government." (quoting Thomas Jefferson)); id. at 311 ("For
this reason that convention which passed the ordinance of government laid its foundation on this basis,
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no
person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time." (quoting Thomas
Jefferson)); id. at 313 ("[A] mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several
departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical
concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.") (emphasis added throughout).
331. See THE FEDERAUsr No. 47, at 307 ("In citing these cases, in which the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct ••••" (emphasis
omitted and added)); THE FEDERAUsrNo. 49, at 314 ("But there appear to be insuperable objections
against the proposed recurrence to the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several
departments ofpower within their constitutional limits."); THE FEDERAUsr No. 50, at 317 ("I confine
myself to their aptitude for enforcing the Constitution, by keeping the several departments ofpower
within their due bounds • • • •" (first emphasis in original)); id. at 319 ("It is at least problematical
whether the decisions of this body, do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits prescribed for
the legislative and executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places."); THE FEDERAUsr No. 51, at 320 ("To what expedient, then, shall we finally
resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as
laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is that ••• its several constituent
parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.")
(emphasis added throughout).
332. See, e.g., THE FEDERALisrNo. 48, at 308 ("It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of
the other departments. It is equally evident that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly,
an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers."); THE
FEDERAUsrNo. 51, at 321-22 ("But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments •••. "); id. at 322 ("We see
it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be check on the other . • • •")
(emphasis added throughout).
333. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States •••• "); art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises •••• ").
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creates the political power to do those things.334 By failing to see both
as sources of power, too many have inadvertently forsaken an important
part of the history that has in fact helped us to maintain separate centers of
institutional power.
In the end, my rereading suggests two lessons for the committed
originalist. First, it suggests that originalists must consider more seriously
questions about the nature of the Founders' intent before asking whether
that intent should apply. When the Founders sought to separate "powers,"
what did they consider the "powers" to be? I have given one answer to
these questions. I have argued that, in the Madisonian scheme, power is
created by the relationship of governors to the governed, power is
distributed according to its perceived weight, and departments are kept
separate by separate political allegiances. These are facts about the
political world, not lines in the sand. My rereading may not be the only
available reading of 'lhe Federalist's text, but, at the very least, it raises
questions that deserve greater attention from those who urge us so
strenuously to "remember the Founders."
Second, my rereading suggests that originalists are correct in their call
to maintain the separation ideal, but mistaken in the content of that ideal.
Originalists have been right to insist that separation is important; they have
been less successful at explaining why. Too often, they have sought to
defend the ideal by proposing a departmental purity that saves separation
for its own sake: we seek departmental purity because we find quotations
in texts that tell us that the separation of powers is important even if we no
longer understand what the texts or the quotations mean by "separation"
or by "powers." Although Madison's thought on the separation of powers
often seems muddy, we know this: separation is important and it is
important for good reasons-to prevent governmental corruption and
institutional collapse. Originalists have not been wrong in searching for a
plausible and stable ideal of separation; they have simply been looking for
that ideal in all the wrong places.

B.

Lessons for Functionalists, Lessons for Formalists: Functional
Assumptions Matter

Those not busy waging the war for an "original" separation of powers
have focused instead upon the warring concepts of "formalism" and

334. U.S. CoNsr. art. I,§ 2, cl. 1 ("TheHouseofRepresentativesshall becomposedofMembers
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States ••••");art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate
of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof ••••"); art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (providing that the president shall be elected by a majority of
electors appointed by the States); see PHlUP BOBBI'IT, CONSTlTUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THB
CONSTlTUTION 80 (1982) (noting that structural argument is "grounded in the actual text of the
Constitution" but not "the passages" that involve "express grants of power or particular prohibitions").
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"functionalism. " 335 Like the originalist, the formalist typically stresses
the importance of maintaining three departments as "distinct," although that
commitment does not necessarily hinge upon historical pedigree. 336
Formalists are unwilling to tolerate modifications to an idealized schematic
of three separate departments performing three unique functions. 337 The
functionalist position, on the other hand, accommodates significant deviation from the norm. Functionalists are willing to tolerate any arrangement
that does not interfere with "core" functions of existing departments. 338
Formalists and functionalists differ primarily in their sense of whether
a strict separation of powers is a question of authority or legitimacy.
Formalists urge us to play by a consistent set of rules/39 arguing that,
without such an approach, our government rests on little more than shifting
political sands.340
Attempts to cross departmental boundaries are
inherently suspect because they violate the sense of order required by legal
rules uniformly applied. 341 By contrast, functionalists do not see the
question so much as one of legitimacy or authority as one of pragmatism.
The question for functionalists is whether our government should constitute
a "workable" whole. If a governmental innovation does no obvious
damage to the underlying structure of the government, the functionalist is
unwilling to oppose such an innovation simply because it violates an
idealized notion of departmental purity.342
335. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 13, at 1254-57 (discussing the formalist and functionalist
approaches); Merrill, supra note 13, at 227, 230-35 (arguing that "neither formalism nor functionalism
provides a satisfactozy account of the constitutional principle of separation of powers"); Strauss, supra
note 9, at 520-26 (advocating a functionalist approach to resolving separation of powers issues);
Tushnet, supra note 13, at 597-603 (arguing that formalism and functionalism converge).
336. The formalist position overlaps, but does not require, the originalist emphasis on the Framers'
"intent." See, e.g., Redish & Cisar, supra note 13, at 494-97 (criticizing "selective originalism," but
embracing "pragmatic formalism").
337. Id. at 453 (explaining that the formalist position is "grounded on the deceptively simple
principle that no branch may be permitted to exercise any authority definitionally found to fall outside
its constitutionally delineated powers").
338. This distinction is laid out in several works, most notably in Brown, supra note 8, at 152231, and Strauss, supra note 9, at 489, 512-22. See also Merrill, supra note 13, at 230.35 (explaining
both the methodological and substantive differences between functionalism and formalism). One of the
most incisive critiques of this position is contained in Tushnet, supra note 13, at 581, 582-85, 603-05
(arguing that "there are no substantive differences between [formal and functional] approaches").
339. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 13, at 476 ("No doctrinal model other than a formalistic
approach can assure that a system of separation of powers will perform its prophylactic function.").
340. Without embracing a crude formalism, Stephen Carter makes this point in his defense of a
"de-evolutionazy" approach. See Carter, Improprieties, supra note 13, at 365 ("If the structural
provisions of the Constitution evolve freely as the felt politieal needs of the countzy change, then we
might as well say that the federal government controls the Constitution rather than, as we teach
schoolchildren, the other way around.").
341. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 13, at 454 (asserting that pure formalism requires a
commitment to strict definitional boundaries).
342. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 583, 582-83 (asserting that functionalists will accept the
constitutionality of a statute as long as the statute does "not substantially alter the general balance of
power among the branches").
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Although approaching the problem from different perspectives,
formalists and functionalists share more than is generally assumed. They
both make a crucial assumption about the importance of functional
description to the separation of powers. A "formal separation of powers
analysis begins with an abstract definition of the tasks of legislation,
execution of the law, and adjudication. " 343 These descriptions are then
used to "test" the challenged action. Functional analysis conducts a similar
intellectual exercise, but proceeds in reverse: it asks whether the challenged
action interferes with a "core function" or the successful performance of
an essential function of an existing department. 344 From whichever
direction they proceed, formalists and functionalists agree upon one thing:
the idea that an institution may be reduced to its functional "essence."
Whether one's goal is to fit new entities within the essential identity of an
existing institution or to test whether the new entity leaves the essential
identity of that institution intact, both approaches necessarily assume that
functional description is both possible and desirable. 345
In their continuing debate, neither formalists nor functionalists have
questioned the shared assumption upon which they proceed. As I have
argued above, if allegiance propels separation, functional purity becomes
irrelevant and core integrity becomes a derivative, or secondary, goal of
any effort to maintain structural integrity. Functional divisions stand in for
other goals-the protection of individual rights, the construction of an
efficient government, the security of incomplete power. But if what we are
interested in is exclusively "separation," then functional purity is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient explanation of why the departments retain
separate institutional identities.
Rather than focusing on function, I have argued that we must focus
first on questions of political relationship. If a structural innovation
permits members of one department to manipulate members of another
department, the innovation may be dangerous to structure whether or not
it interferes with a core function or violates an ideal of functional purity.
Consider, for example, a case in which Congress creates a new agency it
locates in the executive department. The enacting legislation requires
Congress to appoint three members of the agency's governing board. Put

343. Id. at 584.
344. Krent, supra note 13, at 1255, 1254-55; see, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
384, 382-84 (1989) (applying a functional approach in upholding the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677-85 (1988) (applying a functional approach in upholding the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
345. Mark Tushnet has also argued that these positions are not as divergent as they seem. His
claim is different than mine, however; it rests upon the idea that "functionalism" is simply a "more
defensible formalism" because functional analysis is, by its terms, nearly impossible for courts to
perform in anything but a "formalistic" way. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 596 ("Because judges are
neither political scientists nor prophets, they cannot be functionalists either.").
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to the side questions of the Appointments Claus~ and focus, instead,
on how the contemporary debate would characterize the separation of
powers questions. The formalist will argue that this arrangement violates
the separation of powers because the "appointment" function resides in the
executive branch and the statute vests this function in Congress, where it
does not belong. 347 Because the function crosses departmental lines, it
is inconsistent with the separation of powers. The functionalist will arrive
at the opposite conclusion, chiding the formalist for failing to recognize
that Congress frequently exercises the appointment function by helping to
name or actually naming a variety of persons, such as the director of the
Congressional Budget Office, the capitol police, and various other
congressional personnel. 348 The functionalist will argue that the statute
impairs no "core" function of the executive because the executive does not
lose its institutional integrity by parting with such a minor "function" as
appointing three persons in an otherwise massive bureaucracy. 349
Now, let us look at the same problem from a different perspective.
Consider the possibility that the issue is not one of function, but of
allegiance. From this perspective, the question is not whether Congress
has taken for itself an improper function, but whether Congress's proposal
creates the risk that the officers appointed will serve two masters. The
focus is no longer on what the Congress "does" or what the executive
"does," but on political incentives and constitutional structure. Under this
approach, the statute raises questions not because it violates some formal
ideal or undermines a "core" function, but because it permits one
department-the Congress-to exercise a political influence-the influence
of patronage-over the members of another department that the

346. U.S. CONSI'. art. n, § 2, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has never precisely delineated the
relationship between the Appointments Clause and the separation of powers. More often than not, it
has sidestepped Appointments Clause questions and resolved cases on separation of powers grounds.
See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501
U.S. 252, 277 n.23 (1991) (expressing no opinion as to whether the appointment of members of
Congress to an ail:port governing board violates the Appointments Clause).
347. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 271-77 (holding that Congress may not
delegate decisionmaking authority to a group of its members or agents when such a group exercises
"executive" power); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986) (holding that Congress may not
control an officer exercising "executive" power).
348. 2 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (1994) (providing that the Speaker of the House and president pro
tempore of the Senate appoint the Congressional Budget Office director); 40 U.S.C. § 206 (1988)
(providing that the capitol police sre to be chosen by the sergeants at arms of the House and Senate);
44 U.S.C. § 740 (1988) (authorizing the sergeant at arms of the Senate and the doorkeeper of the
House of Representatives to appoint superintendents of the Senate Service Department and the House
Publications Services). Indeed, the Constitution expressly provides that the Senate exercise the power
to "chuse their other officers." U.S. CONSI'. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
349. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 286 (White, 1., dissenting) (making a
similar pragmatic argument that it was "absurd" to suggest that Congress's control over an ail:port
review board was a "legislative usurpation" amounting to "tyranny").
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Constitution does not otherwise permit. Unless other provisions were
made, such a practice could, in effect, collapse the departments by
rendering persons in the executive branch effectively answerable both to
Congress and to the president.
The lesson my rereading offers for the debate between formalists and
functionalists is that they share more than meets the eye. The labels
dichotomize, but formalists are less formal and functionalists more formal
than their insignia suggest. When formalists reach for purity, they reach
for purity based on functional description-a conceptual process that hardly
leads to formal, in the sense of determinate, results.3so At the same time,
when functionalists reach to protect the "core" of a department, they
depend at least in part upon an ideal of separation that seems distinctly
formal-a separation that depends upon three distinct descriptions. Both
share an assumption similar to the one originalists make: that the separation
of powers is the separation of legal power (generalized as "function").
Neither considers the possibility that what they are separating may be
different in kind.

C.

Lessons for the Court: Protecting Allegiance to Place

What, then, should this rereading tell us about the Supreme Court's
approach toward separation of powers cases?351 At the most obvious
level, it suggests that the Court's penchant for indiscriminate reliance on
The Federalist-Madison as pragmatist, Madison as disciplinarian, Madison
as confused-is both unwise and misleading. The essays ask and answer
a question different from the one the Court routinely asks. Because the
essays assume a given distribution of power, they tell us very little about
whether the president may run the steel mills or whether Congress may
give away the legislative store.352
At the same time, this rereading does provide significant lessons for
the Court when it comes to the "due foundation" for the separation of
powers. To use Madison's terms, separation requires independence, and
independence means protecting the hands in which power is held from

350. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 749, 736-59 (Stevens, 1., concurring) ("[G]overmental powers
cannot always be readily characterized with only one of ••• three labels. On the contrary, as our cases
demonstrate, a particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of the office to which
it is assigned.").
351. For the purposes of this essay, I assume that the Court will continue to consider such claims
justiciable. Cf. 1ESSB H. CHOPBR, 1UDICIALRBv!BW AND THB NATIONAL POUTICAL PROCESS 260-379
(1980) (arguing that many separation of powers issues should be considered nonjusticiable).
352. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (deciding whether
President Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills was constitutional); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714
(deciding whether Congress could give its budget-making authority to a congressional agent). 1he
Federalist essays on the separation of powers do not offer much help in deciding the questions raised
in either case.
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corrupt manipulation. This represents a significant advance in our
understanding about the relationship between appointment and removal
powers and the separation of powers. Although the Supreme Court has
frequently addressed such issues, it has never explained why or how facts
about "office" affect the institutions we seek to separate. Indeed, the
Court has seesawed from one extreme to another, embracing at one
moment the importance of attributes such as the removal power-353 and,
in the next, rejecting them as stuffy formalism. 354
My rereading helps us to see that some of this confusion may be
dispelled, but only if we reject both the formalists' enthusiasm and the
functionalists' indifference to the attributes of office. Removal and
appointment powers are not simply "technical details. " 355 They may be
crucial to maintaining a system in which the "interest of the man" is
aligned with the "constitutional rights of the place. " 356 I emphasize,
however, that the attributes of office (including removal and appointment)
are only crucial in certain cases-cases in which they pose a risk of
structural collapse (when one department has sought to monopolize power
by, in effect, "stealing" another department's employees). 357 This does
not mean that all questions about removal and appointment, nor all
questions of cross-departmental influence, raise separation of powers
questions. If one department has not used the attributes of office to inject
itself into another department-to breach the union of "the place" and the

353. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 713 (striking down the provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
budget law that allowed Congress to remove the comptroller general, largely because "[a] direct
congressional role in the removal of officers charged with the execution of laws beyond [impeachment]
is inconsistent with the separation of powers").
354. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 n.28 (1988) (rejecting application of the stringent
focus on removal adhered to in Bowsher). Traditionally, the Court's opinions focusing on the removal
power have been criticized as "formalistic." See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 9, at 488; Gewirtz, supra
note 247, at 348, 349 n.21 (both characterizing the Court's opinion in Bowsher as "fonnalistic"). My
rereading suggests that the removal power raises more than purely formal questions; at the same time,
my rereading rejects the approach toward removal taken in cases such as Bowsher. Bowsher was not
a case in which one department sought to manipulate the employees of another and, as such, does not
raise the risk that one department will infiltrate another. Bowsher raises two different issues: (1)
whether the president may anticipatorily alienate his veto on questions ofimportancesuch as the budget
and (2) whether Congress may avoid hard decisionmaking by creating its own set of agents to make
decisions it would otherwise delegate to the executive department. On this second issue, see Gewirtz,
supra note 247, at 349, 348-49 (arguing that removal was not the crucial issued raised by GrammRudman-Hollings; rather, it was whether Congress may "bind[] itself with a series of mechanical
across-the-board spending cuts rather than making considered value choices on an ongoing basis").
355. Contra Morrison, 487 U.S. at 703 (Scalia, I., dissenting) (complaining that the majority
opinion rests on "such technical details as the Appointments Clause and the removal power" instead
of the separation of powers doctrine).
356. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322.
357. I do not mean to suggest by these terms that the department intentionally sought to inject
itself into a rival institution; I use the terms "monopolize" and "steal" for emphasis.
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"interest[s] of the man" 358-restrictions on removal or appointment may
pose no threat of improper dependence. Thus, this analysis leaves standing
a variety of influences on the attributes of officel59 as well as a variety
of cross-departmental influences that do not undermine allegiance.360
To see how this analysis differs from the Supreme Court's current
approach toward such issues, let us look at Morrison v. Olson,361 perhaps
the most important case on the removal power in the past decade. In
Morrison, the Supreme Court was asked to adopt a formal position toward
removal, barring Congress from any effort to limit the president's control
over so-called "independent" agencies or officers. The Court declined the
invitation, upholding Congress's power to limit the president's political
control over the office of the "independent counsel"362 created by Title
VI of the Ethics in Government Act. 363 The Supreme Court reached this
conclusion using a classically "functional" analysis. The Court reasoned
that, whatever interference Congress may have placed between the
president and the independent counsel, it did not undermine the president's
performance of his functions. 364 As the Court put it,
Although the counsel exercises no small amount of discretion and
judgment in deciding how to carry out his or her duties under the
Act, we simply do not see how the President's need to control the
exercise of that discretion is so central to the functioning of the
Executive Branch as to require as a matter of constitutional law that
the counsel be terminable at will by the President.365

358. THE FEDERAUSTNo. 51, at 322.

359. For example, it leaves Congress free to determine the terms of removal of executive branch
employees. See infra text accompanying notes 388-89.
360. Informal contacts between the departments frequently cross departmental lines and may be
directed at specific officeholders. The difference between such cases and those I posit here is that in
none of the former cases are the "attributes of office" used to undermine the allegiance of political
rivals to their own department. At the end of the day, the executive department employee who has
been lobbied by a member of Congress knows that she may not be fired by a member of the legislative
branch. This does not mean that Congress does not affect the tenure of exeeutive department
employees; it does. See Lours FisHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICfS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PREsiDENT 80-83 (1991) (detailing informal congressional efforts that lead to the dismissal of executive
officers). This informal power, however, has limits-limits that prevent Congress from determining
the membership of the executive branch. Id. at 83.
361. 487U.S. 654 (1988). I take no position here on the application of Article n to the question
of a "unitary executive," basing my arguments solely on the separation of powers. I see nothing in
The Federalist Nos. 47-51, however, to support a "unitary executive" theory. See supra note 329.
362. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696-97.
363. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988). Although this law lapsed in 1992 when Congress failed to
reratizy it, the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act was passed on June 30, 1994. Pub. L. No.
103-270 S2, 108 Stst. 732.
364. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-97.
365. Id. at 691-92 (footnote omitted).
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From the perspective of departmental allegiance, this rationale is
problematic. If accepted, it would permit Congress to grant itself powers
that pose a significant threat to departmental allegiance. 366 Imagine
statute in which Congress granted itself the power to remove particular
inferior officers. 367 Each individual removal would appear unimportant
enough to pass the "functional" test-none alone would seem "so central
to the functioning of the Executive Branch" as to interfere with the
president's constitutional authority. 368 At the same time, each might be
quite effective in signalling to other employees that Congress might try to
remove them as well. If an executive department employee knows that a
member of Congress may remove her, the officer will be sorely tempted
to allow her personal "interest" in maintaining her job to determine the
public obligations of her department. If Congress did in fact grant itself
such authority and it were upheld under Morrison's rationale, Congress
could in effect "create" its own agents or representatives throughout the
executive department. Extended to more and more individuals, such a
power would pose a very serious threat to the continued political separation
of the departments.
That the Morrison analysis is faulty does not, however, mean that we
must embrace the argument on the other side-that Congress may never
limit the president's removal power. The difficulty with Morrison and its
critics is that both see the removal power in precisely the same way. Both
positions fail to distinguish between "removal" issues that allow a
department to "rig" the rules of the political game and "removal" issues
that do not. When Congress passes a statute barring the president from
dismissing an officer except upon "good cause," it undeniably
circumscribes the president's power of removal. 369 This limits the
political power of presidents. But it does not allow one department to

a

366. By emphasizing departmental competition, I do not mean to embrace the position that any
and all measures that might enhance competition are consistent with the separation of powers. My
analysis suggests that the role for the Court is not in regulating political competition but in ensuring
that it is not "rigged" before it starts. My proposal is far more analogous to an antimonopoly standard
than economic substantive due process.
367. Such an effort would not be without precedent. During the nineteenth century, Congress
made significant efforts to insert itself into the removal process. The Tenure of Office Act of 1867 .
provided that Cabinet officers "shall hold their offices ••• during the term of the President ••• subject
to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." This statute led, eventually, to political
war between the departments and the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson. See WlLUAM
H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 210-16 (1992) (describing President Johnson's attempt to remove
the Secretary of War, who was allied with Johnson's congressional opponents, and his subsequent
impeachment for defYing the Tenure of Office Act).
368. See Strauss, supra note 9, at 513 ("At best, 'core function' analysis can guard against a
sudden demarche, but not against the step-by-step accretion of 'reasonable' judgments over time.").
369. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (acknowledging, implicitly, a reduction in presidential power
in stating that "we cannot say that the imposition of a 'good cause' standard for removal by itself
unduly trammels on executive authority" (emphasis added)).
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infiltrate another. Separation implies a qualitative, not a quantitative,
difference in structure. If what we are concerned with is maintaining a
base level of institutional separation, rough judgments about the quantity
of power shifted tell us very little about whether separation is at issue at
all.
We can see this more clearly if we consider Madison's position on
removal, which incorporates the distinction I am drawing. During the
removal debate of 1789, Madison opposed those who sought a role for the
Senate in removing executive branch officers. At the start of the debate,
Madison urged that the "removal power" was in its "nature" an executive
power and that the Take Care Clause370 meant that the president should
hold the removal power.371 This claim, however, ran right into another
textual provision-the Senate's power of advice and consent to the
Under traditional interpretive
appointment of executive officers. m
practices of the time, Madison had to concede the plausibility of the
argument that the "removal" power followed the "appointment"
power. 373
Confronted with conflicting texts (neither of which explicitly resolves
the issue), Madison shifted tacks, focusing on the separation of
powers. 374 The "sacred" principle of separation was at its most
important, Madison told Congress, "when it relates to officers and
office. " 375 The legislature sets the terms of office: "[it] creates the
office, defines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a
compensation. " 376 This done, it "ought to have nothing to do with
designating the man to fill the office. "371 We would be "insecure" if
Congress could do otherwise, Madison urges, for the practice would soon
threaten the constitutional "independence of each branch of the
government. " 378 The danger Madison feared was the same one he had
noted in Federalist No. 48. 379 To allow Congress a role in naming or
removing particular executive branch officers was to risk departments

370. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (requiring the president to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed").
371. James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 16, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 153, at 225, 226, 228; Madison, supra note 244, at 233.
372. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
373. See Madison, supra note 244, at 233 ("[l]f nothing more was said in the constitution than
the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, should appoint to office, there would
be great force in saying that the power of removal resulted by a natural implication from the power of
appointing.").
374. Id. at 234.
375. Madison, supra note 153, at 255.
376.
377,
378.
379.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 255-56.
THE FEDERAUST No. 48, at 308-13.
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wedded to each other by personal interest. It was to risk the legislative
tyranny Jefferson had decried: 380 "What security have they [the people]
but offices will be created to accommodate favorites or pensioners
subservient to their [Congress's] designs?"381 Thus, in private, Madison
warned Edmund Randolph that, if the Senate were to be given a voice in
the removal ()f individual officers, "the Ex[ecutive] power would slide into
one branch of the Legislature. ~ 82
This aspect of Madison's argument rejects the most prevalent,
contemporary understandings of the removal power. The unitary executivists emphasize Madison's references to the "unity" and "responsibility"
of the executive department, to the Take Care Clause, and to the
president's inability to perform his functions if forced to rely upon
"agents" of the Congress. 383 But this ignores Madison's explicit
distinction between a congressional role in setting the "terms" of office and
a congressional role in "designating" the man.384 Shortly after the
removal debate, Madison was to make good on this distinction, explicitly
urging that Congress reduce the president's political control over the
comptroller general by limiting this officer's tenure. 385
Although
Madison urged a limit on the president's control over the comptroller's
office, 386 he never suggested during this debate that Congress be
permitted the right to decide whether a particular comptroller would stay
or go.

380. Id. at 310-11.
381. Madison, supra note 153, at 256.
382. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 17, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 153, at 230.
383. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 13, at 643 (invoking Madison's arguments to
support the unitary executivist position). But see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 17-20 (disputing
the unitary executivists' view that Madison opposed all limitations on the president's removal power).
On the debate about the Take Care Clause, compare A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's
New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994) and A. Michael Froomkin, Still Naked After All1hese
Words, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1420 (1994) with Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power
Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994).
384. Madison, supra note 153, at 255.
385. The precise nature of Madison's proposal regarding the comptroller general is not clear, and
this has raised quite a bit of controversy. Compare Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 17 (arguing
that Madison's proposal demonstrated a willingness to accept a joint executive-legislative role in the
removal process) with Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 13, at 652-55 (responding that strong opposition
and Madison's subsequent withdrawal of the proposal make "the proposition that the First Congress
contemplated an executive/administrative distinction seem[] rather suspect"). My argument does not
depend upon the significance of the proposal but, rather, upon Madison's apparent justification for it.
386. Madison appears to have argued that the comptroller general's tenure be limited because his
duties were quasi-judicial. See Madison, supra note 272, at 265 ("[T]here may be strong reasons why
an officer of this kind should not hold his office at the pleasure of the executive branch of the
government."). Note that my argument does not rely solely on this provision, but upon an interpretation of Madison's removal speeches consistent with his position on the separation of powers. Cf.
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 17 n.70 (suggesting it unwise to rely simply upon Madison's
position on the comptroller general issue to argue against the "unitary executive").
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The error made by those who resist Congress's attempt to limit the
president's political dismissals is identical to the one made in the context
of the separation of powers-the tendency to see the removal power as a
question of undifferentiated legal authority rather than of political
relationship across departments. 387 By focusing on the "removal power,"
critics of independent agencies construct an object that may be described
either one of two ways-as "executive" or "legislative." There are only
two questions and two answers posed by the "removal power": "Yes,"
Congress may limit the removal power, or "No," Congress may not limit
that power. Under this approach, Madison's position represents pure
contradiction: one day, he urges presidential Imity, and days later he is
willing to undermine that unity.
If I am correct that we should focus our attention first on whether one
department has attempted to rig the rules of political rivalry and allegiance,
the "removal" question is not an all or nothing proposition. One may quite
consistently claim that Congress should have no share in the removal
power of particular officers and, at the same time, that it may limit the
terms of any particular office. For Congress to limit the executive's
removal power may alter the political calculus within the executive
department-it may even reduce the president's political power vis-a-vis
Congress388-but it does not rig the rules of the political game. It does
not permit a rival department-Congress-to infiltrate the membership of
the executive branch directly or indirectly.
It is only in those
circumstances that Madison would have been willing to say, as he did of
Congress's efforts in 1835 to inject itself into individual removal decisions,

387. The unitary executivist will no doubt pick up on the term "political relationship" and suggest
that the important political relationship is from the "top down"-from the president to his subordinates
to the people. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 13, at 594 (concluding that the Constitution crestes
a "subordinate/superior relationship" between the president and the other officers of the executive
branch). My analysis suggests precisely the opposite approach-that the important point for the
separation of powers is not the president's control of "his men and women," but the allegiance of the
"men and women" to the president, from the "bottom up." When Congress seeks to interfere with that
allegiance-by "connecting" to itself members of the executive department-that threatens separation.
The same cannot be said for congressional actiona that simply reduce the strength of political
connections within the executive department by weakening the president's political hold over his "men
and women." See, e.g., Madison, supra note 244, at 236 ("If the president should possess alone the
power of removal from office, those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in their
proper situation, and the chain of dependence be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and
the highest, will depend, as they ought, on the president •••• ").
388. If what we are considering is the raw quantum of power, a signiticantargumentmay be made
that the "independent counsel" does in fact reduce the power of the executive department. Like Mark
Tushnet, I doubt whether claims about the "quantum" of power exchanged are effectively justiciable
because judges have no way to weigh or measure such claims. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 601
(expressing doubt that courts could judge close separation of powers cases without effective criteria to
determine when shifts in power "thresten either to weaken the government below the constitutionally
prescribed level or to make it tyrannical").
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that the relationship of the Constitution and Congress had been reversed:
Congress had become "the creator of the Constitution," rather than its
"creature. " 389
Understood this way, the Supreme Court was right to reject the
removal argument in Morrison, albeit for the wrong reasons. If the
separate exercise of power is our goal, then the independent counsel, like
other independent agencies, poses little threat of structural collapse. By
limiting the president's removal power, Congress does not gain, for itself,
the ability to infiltrate the executive department. No one doubts, or should
doubt, that the counsel's independence "separates" it from other
departments. Indeed, it is ironic but true that the very idea of
independence enshrined in the independent-counsel law replicates the
underlying principles of the separation of powers-the idea that independent persons achieve separate powers. 390 If there is a problem with the
independent counsel, it is not that it is not "separate" from other
departments391-it is that it is "too separate" from the people and thus
raises important questions of accountability. Those questions are different
in nature and kind, however, from questions about what separates the
departments.
My analysis obviously leaves significant questions unanswered. The
"foundation" I have highlighted provides a basic level of insurance against
departmental collapse. It leaves for another day, however, important
questions about the political relationships between the departments and their
constituents. 392 It is these relationships, relationships of accountability,
389. DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAsT OF THE FATHERS 104 (1989) (quoting Letter from lames
Madison to Charles Francis Adams (Oct. 12, 1835), in 1X THB WRITINGS OF lAMBS MADISON 562-63
(Gaillard Hunted., 1910)).
390. See supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting Madison on "independence" as a foundation
for the "separation" of power).
391. In theory, at least, this still leaves open a significant question with respect to the independent
counsel. Presumably, if it could be shown that Congress was using the independent counsel law to
"remove" particular executive department officials by threat of criminal prosecution, then it might be
likened to a statute in which Congress determined the removal of individual officers. Note, however,
that this argument depends not at all upon the "removal power" in the abstract, unitary executive
theory, or a formalist's enthusiasm for the removal power-the standard reasons the independentcounsel law has been seen as suspect.
392. Larry Kramer has recently presented an important new argument about the role of politics
and federalism that has interesting implications for my thesis. Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 41 VAND. L. RBv. 1485 (1994). lust as I argue here that political allegiances maintain
the Constitution's departmental structure, Kramer argues that political allegiances have created a
meaningful relationship between the states and the federal government. Id. at 1519-42. Unlike my
analysis here, however, Kramer focuses primarily on the role of political parties in forging alliances
between state and federal political figures. Where the separation of powers is concerned, political party
influence may work two ways-it may enhance the working relationship of the departments or it may
provide a reason why departments agree to forsake the separation of powers. Whether party loyalties
enhance or detract from the separation of powers seems, in the end, to depend upon whether party ties
reinforce or undermine institutional allegiance. In my view, the same holds true for federalism-if
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that will ultimately determine many of the more burning questions about
the separation of powers. Protecting allegiance may prevent one department from infiltrating another, but it provides no answers to questions
about whether Congress may delegate its budget-setting powers to the
executive, whether the line-item veto will withstand judicial scrutiny, or
whether executive branch agencies may adjudicate common-law claims.
Those are questions not of separation but of power. As such, they cannot
be resolved by simple resort to a model of political competition, but
require us to build a better understanding of the relationships of
accountability the Constitution creates and how shifts in those relationships
should affect the separation of powers.
The lesson I leave for the Supreme Court to consider is this: before
we reject structural innovations on the strength of functional or other
descriptions, consider whether one department has, in effect, attempted to
cleave to itself the members of another branch and thus driven a wedge
between the "interest of the man" and the "place." This will not answer
all separation of powers questions, but, at the very least, it offers us a "due
foundation" that preserves structure for a reason, not for structure's sake.

political parties allow state and federal officials to forge alliances, these alliances only work to preserve
a meaningful role for the states if the state actors' maintain a powerful allegiance to the state. (I thank
Allan Stein for bringing Prof. Kramer's article to my attention.)
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